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Preface 
In the spring semester of 1981 the Center for East Asian Studies at 
the University of Kansas sponsored a "Colloquium on Asian Security 
Policies." The colloquium was partially supported by a National Resource 
Center grant from the United States Department of Education. 
In an attempt to examine various salient aspects of the changing Asian 
security issues, five distinguished scholars were invited to give public 
lectures at the colloquium. Since each scholar s presentation stimulated a 
great deal of interest and follow-up discussion among the colloquium 
participants, the Center for East Asian Studies decided to edit a volume of 
their presentations as revised and to share it with those who were unable 
to take part in the colloquium. I regret that this volume cannot include 
Dr. Thomas W. Robinson's paper on "The Soviet Security Policy in Asia" 
because it was not submitted on time. It is hoped that this volume will 
further encourage intellectual discourse on security policies of East Asia. 
I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to 
the five scholars for their presentations, to the colloquium participants 
(especially those from the United States Army Command and General Staff 
College) for their sustained and enthusiastic interests, to Randall 
Oestreicher, Anne Wallace, and Nancy Kaul for their able assistance, and to 
the Department of Education for its partial financial support. The 
cooperation provided by G. Cameron Hurst III is also gratefully 
acknowledged. Needless to say, each individual author is solely 
responsible for the contents of his essay and he does not represent the 
views of the Department of Education or the Center for East Asian Studies. 
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It has been my privilege to organize the colloquium and to assume the 
editorial responsibility for this publication. 
January 15, 1982 Chae-Jin Lee 
Center Co-Director 
VI 
American Perceptions of Asian Security 
Akira Iriye 
After a hiatus following the war in Vietnam, the question of Asian 
security seems once again to be agitating the governments of America and 
Asia. Does the increasing naval presence of the Soviet Union in the region 
pose a threat to peace in Northeast Asia? How long will the antagonism 
between the Soviet Union and China continue to be a factor in the Asian 
balance of power? Should Japan play a more active role, politically and 
militarily, in maintaining that balance, or would such a policy have 
destabilizing consequences? Should, and could, the United States remain a 
viable Asian power committed to the defense of the status quo? Can 
regional stability be maintained as old leaderships gradually give way to a 
younger generation of leaders in China, Japan, Russia, and other countries, 
where the process of succession has not always been smooth? 
Many symposia have discussed these questions and numerous writers have 
published books and essays addressed to them. While I claim no special 
expertise to add to their wisdom, I will try in this paper to place in 
historical perspective the problem of national security as perceived in the 
United States, then relate it to the present and future of Asian security. 
First, it is worth emphasizing that the concept of security is neither 
a simple nor an unchanging concept. Each generation defines it anew, 
bringing to the redefinition many assumptions about its own country and its 
position in the world. Consider this simple example from the early Cold 
War years. A key American strategic document drafted by the National 
Security Council and approved by President Harry S. Truman in November 
1948, NSC 20/4, concluded, "[the] gravest threat to the security of the 
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United States within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs 
and formidable power of the USSR, and from the nature of the Soviet 
system."1 There are three ingredients in this conception of American 
security: Russia's power, hostile designs, and socio-political system. 
First, the "formidable power" of the Soviet Union is identified as 
immediately relevant to America's own security. As another National 
Security Council paper put it, the USSR "has engaged the United States in a 
struggle for power . . . in which our national security is at stake and 
from which we cannot withdraw short of eventual national suicide."2 But 
why should the mere existence of Soviet power be viewed as a threat to 
American security? Throughout the nineteenth-century Britain was, if 
anything, an even more formidable power on the global scene, but it did not 
impress the Americans as a menace to peace. The answer is that the Soviets 
are perceived to have not only "formidable power" but also "hostile 
designs." The Russians are portrayed as being intent on using their power 
for "the domination of the world." They will do so by extending their 
influence and control over the territory, manpower, and resources of vast 
areas of the world. Thus, it is not so much Soviet power per se, but the 
uses to which it is (and will be) put that are a threat to the survival of 
the United States. 
But do the Russians really have such designs? Is their alleged 
objective of world domination a true reflection of reality, or is it a 
figment of American imagination? While people disagree in their responses 
to these, issues, the crucial fact remains that security is as much a matter 
of perception, or in Daniel Yergin's phrase "a state of mind," as it is a 
given objective.3 What matters is whether the Americans believe the 
Russians have evil designs, not whether they have such ambitions in fact. 
Arguing that the Soviet Union was no ordinary state, but a Communist 
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country with its peculiar traditions and orientations, American strategists 
were convinced in the Cold War years that the Soviet threat was indeed very 
real. As the document cited asserted, the Soviet system made Russia ipso 
facto a threat to peace, because it was in the nature of a Communist state 
to seek to "threaten the existence of free nations." The raison d'etre of 
a Communist state consisted of undermining international order; it could 
not survive otherwise. The very existence of a Communist country, 
therefore, created problems of security for the United States and other 
countries not yet under Communist domination. For this reason, American 
security was viewed as bound up with the survival of all non-Communist 
countries. As expressed in the Truman doctrine of March 1947, the spread 
of Communist regimes "undermine[s] the foundations of international peace 
and hence the security of the United States."1' In such an equation, 
America could never be secure until the Soviet state ceased to exist, or at 
least was compelled to adjust itself to the security requirements of the 
free world, in the words of the famous memorandum, NSC 68, which codified 
the Cold War strategy for years to come.5 
This example indicates that security must be comprehended in a number 
of contexts. It can be understood in terms of military power, that is, the 
number of troops, ships, aircraft, bombs, and other weapons that countries 
possess, or could possess. It is possible to view international affairs as 
interpower relations and define national security accordingly. When 
defined solely with reference to the size of military budgets and armed 
forces, one country's power is interchangeable with that of another. At 
the same time the reference to the Soviet system in the example cited 
suggests that it is also relevant to consider the characteristics of a 
society possessing military power. This is because power in the abstract 
may be less important as a factor contributing to, or undermining peace, 
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than is power in combination with certain characteristics in a potential 
powerwielder. These characteristics would include a country's history, 
traditional behavior patterns, ideologies, politics, and other factors 
that consitute its "culture." It is power combined with culture that 
creates a specific challenge in international relations.6 
This, however, is not all. As the National Security Council memos 
cited earlier reveal, one country's power and culture must be interpreted 
by another. The Soviet Union was defined as a threat to American security 
when Russian power and Soviet ideology were interpreted by Americans in 
such a way that they appeared to be a fundamental challenge to world peace 
and American survival. In theory, Russian power and the Soviet system 
could have been viewed as compatible with these values. Such a view was 
held by some officials who dissented from the Cold War doctrine. Why one 
interpretation prevailed over the other was in part a function of Soviet 
policies and behavior that tended to confirm one view as against the other. 
But Cold War perceptions were also a product of America's own military 
power and domestic politics. After World War II quick demobilization and 
budgetary restrictions left the U.S. global military power inferior to that 
of the Soviet Union, except for the American atomic monopoly which was 
broken in 1949. Characterized by deep hostility to what was considered the 
internal equivalent of world Communism, including, in some extreme cases, 
the New Deal and various radical movements before and during the war, the 
domestic political culture produced a revulsion to the emergence of 
Communist and pro-Communist governments in Europe and Asia. These factors 
combined to dispose American leaders and the people to interpret Soviet 
intentions in certain specific ways. 
Another important factor, illustrated by the Cold War superpower 
confrontation, is the expansion of a country's power into other 
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geographical areas. It was not so much the Soviet Union's large armed 
forces on its own territory that alarmed American strategists and policy 
makers, but their presence in Eastern Europe, Iran, and China. Similarly, 
strategic planners considered America's own military build-up inadequate to 
counter the Soviet challenge. What was required, the National Security 
Council asserted, was to "strengthen the orientation toward the United 
States of the non-Soviet nations."7 Since a pro-American orientation could 
not be expected to develop automatically, it became necessary for the 
United States to undertake massive economic and military aid programs in 
those countries, and to station American forces in a number of them to 
ensure the countries' security from both internal and external foes. 
America and Russia in fact never threatened each other's security directly. 
Yet there were serious confrontations in Berlin, Iran, Cuba, and elsewhere, 
in which the two countries were involved extraterritorially. National 
security became a function not only of what was happening within America or 
even in Russia, but also in third countries. It goes without saying that 
these events in third countries must be viewed both in power and cultural 
terms, and both as they are and as they are perceived and interpreted by 
outsiders. 
Security is thus an enormously complex phenomenon. It would be an 
oversimplification to say that there is only one plausible definition of a 
country's security problem, or only one solution to it. Much depends on 
the global power realities at a given moment, on cultural developments in 
other countries, and on domestic orientations that force certain 
interpretations on external events. This is particularly true when dealing 
with America's role in Asian security. In the context of this region of 
vast human and natural resources, cultural diversity, and political 
turmoil, Asian-American relations have typified the intricate mixture of 
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power and cultural factors that underlie all security questions. American 
perceptions of security in the area are worth examining within such a 
framework. 
To understand contemporary developments in American-Asian relations, 
it is imperative to examine briefly the history of Asian security 
challenges faced by the United States and the ways in which they were dealt 
with. First, security involved the problem of establishing a framework for 
regional stability and order, so that Americans could conduct their affairs 
without fear of molestation. This concern was related primarily to the 
diplomatic, military, and economic presence of Western countries in Asia, 
and to the need for maintaining a balance among them. Second, Japan's 
emergence as the first modern state in Asia posed a challenge to the 
Western powers in general and to the United States in particular. After 
the beginning of the twentieth century, Americans in Asia became hostage to 
Japanese power, and United States territories such as the Philippines and 
Hawaii appeared increasingly vulnerable. Equally important, Japan 
represented an alien culture, and this alienness, combined with Japanese 
power, enhanced a periodic sense of crisis producing war scares in America. 
Third, China posed a challenge to Asian security as a consequence of its 
vast size and its political turmoil during most of the nineteenth century 
and the first half of the twentieth. It was not that Americans in China 
were in a particularly precarious situation. In general, they enjoyed 
safety and comfort to a greater extent than did most Chinese immigrants in 
nineteenth-century America. (A Chinese diplomat insisted in 1887 that "in 
China not a single American has lost his life by mob violence, while in the 
past three years more than thirty Chinese have been murdered through mobs 
in the United States."8) Rather, China's challenge lay in its potential as 
a modern economic and military power. China's population, once organized 
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and mobilized economically and politically, would not only develop into a 
vast market for foreign products, but in view of the Chinese cultural 
heritage, could become a threat to regional and even global stability. 
Finally, nationalist movements in the colonial areas of Southeast Asia 
could jeopardize Asian security. Although national liberation movments did 
not acquire major significance until after World War I, the U.S. having 
experienced serious opposition to its own colonial regime in the 
Philippines would be concerned with this phenomenon. 
Faced with these challenges, the United States traditionally responded 
in a number of ways. America became an active participant in diplomatic 
maneuvers and arrangements with European nations. Contrary to America's 
reputation for having avoided "entangling alliances" in the early years of 
its national existence, recent historical studies have demonstrated 
convincingly that from the beginning active diplomacy aimed at preventing 
the development of a hostile power bloc against the United States was a 
cardinal objective of government. Such diplomacy was primarily intra-
Western diplomacy, insofar as it involved ties with the European powers. 
In Asia, too, the United States was always involved in attempts to preserve 
regional stability through diplomacy. One concrete manifestation of this 
policy was the treaty system, which established a framework for the 
protection of American citizens in Asia, and ensured that all privileges 
accorded other Westerners were also extended to Americans. In addition to 
diplomacy, the United States attempted to ensure its Asian security by 
augmenting its military presence in the region. This was particularly true 
after the Spanish-American War which not only resulted in the acquisition 
of the Philippines, but also in the establishment of a Pacific fleet. 
Military strengthening was considered particularly important as Asian 
affairs came to be viewed in the framework of rivalries among the major 
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powers. There was little dispute concerning the fact that the United 
states was a major Asian power. Without such an image, the United States 
could not defend its possessions and its nationals. The security of 
American nationals became a serious concern as Japanese power came to be 
seen as potentially hostile. It would be essential for the United States 
to offset the growth of that power through naval expansion and 
fortifications, a theme that characterized American-Japanese relations 
during the half century between the Spanish-American War and the Second 
World War. 
But military expansion alone was never considered sufficient, because 
it could easily provoke other countries to do likewise, thereby resulting 
in an arms race. Complementing it, therefore, was an interest in 
geopolitical arrangements as a means for maintaining stability and 
strategic balance. The objective was to conclude an understanding with 
another power with the signatories pledging not to attack each other's 
possessions and if necessary to collaborate against third powers with 
potentially hostile intentions. President Theodore Roosevelt's policy 
toward Japan, one of the earliest applications of this policy tool, sought 
to minimize chances of military conflict between the two countries by 
pledging non-interference in their respective spheres of influence, and by 
attempting to keep Japanese and Americans apart as much as possible. This 
was a power-oriented approach based on the assumption that Japan and the 
United States could maintain a stable relationship as long as they kept 
within their own spheres of influence and observed the regional status quo. 
There was a risk in such a political power approach that the parties to the 
understandings might not always agree on a definition of the status quo. 
Such was the case during the 1930s when Japan decided to enlarge its sphere 
of influence on the continent of Asia and in the Pacific Ocean. In these 
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years the American government never abandoned the idea that some power-
oriented agreement with Japan was possible. At one point President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt toyed with the idea of dividing the Pacific into two 
spheres of influence. As late as November, 1941, the State Department was 
interested in a modus vivendi with Japan through which Japan would 
establish control over China but refrain from expanding further southward. 
War came because no such agreement was achieved, and because the Japanese 
military had resolved to enlarge its sphere of control by force. 
Power politics, however, was not the only means of coping with the 
Japanese challenge. Apart from the risks as outlined above, it never 
succeeded in providing a satisfactory answer to the problem of cultural 
diversity. Could two countries with such diverse historical and cultural 
roots really remain committed to the same conception of stability and 
order? Were not the two societies so different in outlook as to make any 
enduring understanding unattainable? These were crucial questions because 
they had relevance for American relations not only with Japan but with the 
other countries of Asia, and above all China. From the beginnning of the 
twentieth century American officials grew acutely conscious of the need to 
define a policy that would ensure Asian stability and American security in 
an environment of cultural diversity, where political and economic 
upheavals were widespread and where Western colonial domination was being 
challenged by nationalistic movements. 
One solution to these questions, representing an attempt at providing 
a comprehensive framework for coping with Asian security issues, was what 
came to be known as Wilsonian internationalism. Although its premises and 
inspirations antedated President Woodrow Wilson, he did more than anyone 
else to define a systematic approach to international affairs, especially 
in regard to American relations with non-Western countries. Briefly put, 
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his solution was to work for an interdependent, international order in 
which all countries would advance economically and politically, thus giving 
them a stake in a stable, peaceful world. Their destinies would become 
intertwined, and domestic and external developments would become closely 
integrated. This was a security policy in its broadest definition. As the 
Wilsonian internationalists saw it, security could best be guaranteed in a 
world of economic interdependence in which countries would help each other 
through trade, investment, and other transactions. Economic development 
would bring about political maturation, which in turn would produce more 
peaceful orientations. Asia seemed to fit into this picture admirably. 
Japan, the one advanced Asian country, would contribute to regional 
development in cooperation with other industrialized nations. Its economic 
affairs would become increasingly internationalized, and as a consequence 
its domestic politics, too, would become oriented toward international 
cooperation and peace. China, where all power would work together for 
economic development, would be more tightly integrated into the world 
economy, and modernization would bring about an end to internal political 
chaos. The country would be reunified and centralized, and a new mass 
market would generate a wholesome nationalistic sentiment. Similarly, in 
the colonial regions of Asia, economic development would prepare the 
indigenous peoples for political modernization and reform, and ultimately, 
for autonomy and self-determination. Gradually, an interdependent global 
order would replace colonial domination. 
Wilsonian internationalism never had an adequate chance to prove 
itself. A little more than a decade after the doctrine's enunciation the 
world was plunged into an unprecedented economic crisis, putting an end to 
nobler projects about global interdependence and cooperations. Instead, 
nations, including the United States, reverted to traditional solutions 
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such as armament and power politics to safeguard their security interests, 
and they vied with one another in establishing exclusive autarkic regions 
rather than an open world system. Nevertheless, it is important to recall 
that the Wilsonian vision never completely disappeared. From time to time 
attempts were made to reestablish some principles of international 
cooperation. Those principles supplied American officials with a 
vocabulary for condemning Japanese action in Asia. Most important, the 
belief persisted that once the turmoil of economic crisis and militaristic 
aggression was overcome, it would be possible to reconstruct the world 
order along Wilsonian principles. This was the agenda announced, for 
instance, by the Atlantic Charter and various other declarations of the 
United Nations during the war. 
This brief survey indicates that long before 1945 the United States 
had defined the question of Asian security in a number of contexts. 
Furthermore, Washington's traditional handling of the question revealed a 
complex interplay of power and cultural factors in Asia and in the United 
States. In a sense, what developed after 1945 was a continuation of these 
themes. In the aftermath of the war, the United States defined its Asian-
Pacific security in terms of the prevention of a resurgence of Japanese 
militarism. This objective was to be realized by the occupation and 
demilitarization of Japan, by the use of some Pacific islands as American 
bases, and by encouraging the development of Japan along liberal, 
democratic lines. Such a policy joined an emphasis on America's military 
power with the Wilsonian faith in reformism. Washington believed that 
Japan's peaceful behavior could be guaranteed best by defining a new 
domestic order oriented toward democracy and economic pursuits. 
There was also a geopolitical aspect to the immediate postwar Asian 
policy. The United States considered Japan and virtually the entire 
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Pacific its spheres of influence. Regional stabiity would be built on the 
recognition of this fact. America was willing to accept Russia's sphere of 
influence in Northeast Asia, including parts of southern Manchuria and 
northern Korea. One problem with this formulation was that it was not 
always clear how far the Russian sphere was to extend. Although the secret 
Yalta Conference protocol had presumably defined the limits of Soviet power 
in Asia, the chaos in China appeared to invite further Russian penetration. 
For this reason, it seemed necessary from the American viewpoint to try to 
clarify the two powers' respective spheres of influence. This concern can 
be seen in the various announcements by the Truman Administration about 
defense perimeters. These differed little from the prewar attempts to 
delimit Japan's spheres of control. However, as John Gaddis has pointed 
out in his recent study, defense perimeters were not easily established 
because of the pressure of an American domestic opinion that would resist 
any abandonment of China, especially if this was based on the argument that 
China was outside America's perimeter.9 The postwar confusion over 
America's China policy stemmed from the fact that until this time 
Wilsonianism, that is, the idea of promoting modernization, had been_the 
only policy framework vis-a-vis that country. This framework had justified 
the traditional emphasis on helping China become a centralized, democratic 
and economically developed nation. When this failed to materialize, and 
when Communist influence appeared ascendant, the United States faced the 
need to redefine its Asian security policy. In this situation the tendency 
to view China as a power factor, virtually for the first time in the 
history of American strategy in Asia, was a notable development. As Warren 
Cohen and others have noted, China under Communist rule was considered a 
formidable power, but not necessarily a hostile one.10 Nowhere was the 
importance of perceptions more strikingly demonstrated than in the debate 
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among American officials throughout 1949 and 1950 as to whether Chinese 
power should be regarded as a potential threat or a potential asset to 
American security. Concealed under this debate were the Wilsonians such as 
John Carter Vincent, who continued to argue that China would be relevant to 
American interests not as a power, but as an economic and political partner 
in building a more interdependent, liberal world order. The Korean War put 
an end to all argument by bringing about a direct military confrontation 
between the United States and the People's Republic of China. 
In the periods between 1945-1950, then, America's perceptions of Asian 
security continued to be shaped within prewar frameworks such as military 
strenthening, geopolitical arrangements, and Wilsonian internationalism. 
Superimposed on these perceptions, of course, were the developing 
conceptions and ideologies of the Cold War. But, as I have indicated 
elsewhere, the Cold War in a sense of American-Soviet global confrontation, 
both in power and cultural terms, did not inspire a new definition of 
American policy in Asia, at least not until late 1949. It would be more 
accurate to say that the vision of a global power and ideological struggle 
with the Soviet state was adapted to pre-existing policies regarding Japan, 
China, and elsewere. Moreover, even after the outbreak of the Korean War, 
a bipolar confrontation between America and Russia provided only one 
context within which the United States Asian security policy evolved. 
Although there remains much to be researched about American-Asian relations 
during the 1950s, two themes stand out. One theme was Washington's 
encouragement of regional economic development, particularly through close 
ties between Japan and the countries of Southeast Asia. Certainly this 
fitted into the Cold War policy of containing Communism, whether Soviet, 
Chinese, or indigenous in the area. But it should be recalled that the 
objective of economic development and interdependence had been at the heart 
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of Wilsonianism. There was a fundamental continuity between Wilsonian 
internationalist policies of the 1920s and the integrationist policies of 
the 1950s. Both aimed at modernization, and both assumed that economic 
development and political reforms were conducive to stability, thus 
frustrating the more revolutionary movements. It was assumed that 
"militant nationalism," a force viewed with increasing concern by American 
officials, could be moderated by economic and technical assistance, 
provided either directly by the United States or indirectly through Japan. 
A second major theme of the 1950s was the emergence of China as the 
major antagonist in Asia. By 1955, the year of the Austrian neutrality 
treaty and the first summit conference, the bipolar confrontation between 
the U.S. and the USSR could be said to have reached a culmination. In 
Asia, where the bipolar confrontation had never been as decisive, China 
rather than Russia was viewed as a major challenge to the status quo. A 
number of mutual security pacts were concluded to contain China's putative 
expansionism. Taiwan's independent existence was sustained by an American 
military presence. All these measures were taken in the pursuit of 
regional stability and justified on the grounds that the Chinese state 
represented a threat to that stability. As with the earlier conceptions of 
the Soviet threat, such perceptions combined a recognition of China's 
military potential with an interpretation of that country's culture, which 
was reflected in its Communist totalitarianism and anti-imperialist 
rhetoric. This degree of extensive antagonism between the United States 
and China was certainly unprecedented. It eventually led to the American 
military involvement in Southeast Asia to prevent the spread of Asian 
Communism, believed to be centered at Peking. 
American security policy in the 1960s evolved around the war in 
Vietnam. In a sense it represented a culmination of the earlier strands 
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that had characterized American-Asian relations. It entailed the use of 
force, a massive military build-up, and the sheer presence of American 
power and prestige as guarantees for peace and order. It continued the 
policy of encouraging Asian economic development and of self-determination 
by denying indigenous Communists the chance to impose their will on the 
people. American security policy fitted in with the policy of 
strengthening close bilateral ties between Japan and the United States 
which were viewed as the key to Asian peace and development. Designed as a 
check in Chinese power American security policy sought the maintenance of 
regional balance and stability. Finally, it represented a response to the 
problem of nation-building. As Henry Kissinger remarked in 1965, the basic 
challenge in Vietnam was "to discover how a nation can be built when the 
society is torn by internal schisms and in the middle of a civil war."11 
This challenge was a familiar one which had long confronted the United 
States in its dealings with non-Western countries. Traditionally, 
Washington's response had been shaped in the basically Wilsonian framework 
of moderate nationalism and economic development. Vietnam was no 
exception; it was going to be a testing ground for America's reformist 
ideals. 
It was because the Vietnam War summed up all earlier strands in 
America's Asian strategy and policy that its termination led to a 
questioning of those themes in the 1970s. If American perceptions of Asian 
security had resulted in an unfortunate war in Southeast Asia, it followed 
that whatever "lessons of Vietnam" one learned had to deal with the 
premises upon which American policy had been based. In many ways it can be 
argued that the questioning has not ended, and that it has not yet produced 
clearly articulated alternative approaches. One result was a reduction of 
America s military presence in Asia, as exemplified by the so-called Guam 
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Doctrine of 1969, in which President Richard Nixon called on the Asians 
themselves to share in the defense of the area. United States forces were 
totally withdrawn from Southeast Asia, and under the Carter Administration 
preparations were made to reduce them in the Korean peninsula. Another 
consequence of the Vietnam experience was the discrediting of some 
Wilsonian principles. In America the very liberals who had advocated 
Wilsonian internationalism began to ridicule the nation-building crusade in 
Asia as useless, irrelevant, and even immoral. But they offered no 
alternatives other than leaving the Vietnamese on their own in accordance 
with the principle of self-determination. They were disillusioned when 
they discovered a few years later that the Vietnamese were themselves 
trying to impose their control over neighboring Cambodia and Laos. 
One notable development in America's Asian policy has been the 
rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. As Kissinger has 
written the rapprochement indicated "the absolute primacy of geopolitics" 
in international affairs.12 According to the former Secretary of State, 
both the Chinese and the Americans felt the need for a mechanism to 
maintain the Asian balance of power which was dangerously close to .being 
upset by the growth of Soviet power. One could view this as a very hard-
headed, power-oriented strategic decision in which the perceived interests 
of the two countries happened to coincide. The use of geopolitical devices 
was certainly not unprecedented. However, insofar as the United States and 
China had never been close partners in the maintenance of the Asian balance 
of power, the very undertaking of this experiment underscored the failure 
of earlier strategies, as well as a willingness to try out something new. 
In addition, it may be noted that the formation of an entente with China, 
which defined itself as the leader of the Third World, reflected America's 
frustrations in dealing with Third-World countries. It was as if the 
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United States had decided to abandon its traditional initiatives in those 
areas and work through China in dealing with them. 
This in turn may be related to the rise of Third-World nationalism and 
assertiveness throughout the 1970s. This phenomenon is not confined to 
Asia, but it is nevertheless relevant insofar as it points to an erosion of 
optimism about the modernization of the non-Western world. The conflict in 
Vietnam, even to a greater extent than the Communist victory in China, 
seemed to indicate that American conceptions of modernization were not 
necessarily the pattern preferred by non-Western peoples. A number of them 
asserted that they did not want to follow the Western model of 
modernization and in some cases repudiated the modernization option. 
Precisely how they would transform themselves is not yet clear. Lacking 
American initiatives, it is difficult to visualize what alternative schemes 
of national development Third World peoples are going to follow. 
Vietnam and its aftermath also caused some erosion of American ties 
with Japan. Their bilateral relationship had constituted the cornerstone 
of United States security policy in postwar Asia. But in the late 1970s 
the two countries began to show signs of drifting apart because of 
uncertainty about the reliability of American commitments in Asia, the 
growing economic and military power of Japan, and the rivalry between the 
two countries in trade and investment matters. Voices have been heard 
questioning the putative stability of the American-Japanese relations. 
Finally, the American people began to express doubts about some of the 
traditions and orientations of their own society. Although some of this 
questioning would have occurred even if there had been no Vietnam War, that 
episode served as a catalyst for a cultural revolution in America, in which 
traditional values, standards, and institutions came under attack. 
Societal bonds and convictions weakened just as American power and prestige 
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suffered a decline overseas. Abetted by severe domestic economic crises 
which were related to the massive spending of the 1960s, this situation 
fostered an atmosphere in which it was common even for public figures to 
talk of America's becoming a second-class power, and of its society having 
lost the vitality and sense of direction that had made the country what it 
was. 
Today, the situation in Asia is volatile. As I suggested at the 
outset, there are a number of major unresolved questions involving security 
and new ones emerge constantly. It may be that Americans and other peoples 
are finally coming to the realization that they must devise an effective 
approach to these problems if they are not to become engulfed in major 
crises from sheer passivity. But is is far from clear precisely how they 
should define their objectives, and what means they should utilize to 
achieve them. Despite past frustrations and failures in pursuing certain 
objectives, the blanket rejection of these goals as irrelevant to the needs 
of the present would be ill-advised. On the other hand, mere perpetuation 
of past themes and methods would obviously not do. We must create a fresh 
synthesis of traditional ideas and novel approaches. I would suggest, for 
example, that the Wilsonian cbncept of global interdependence through 
peaceful communication across national boundaries is still valid in today's 
world, but it would need to be updated by stressing the necessity for 
dealing with other peoples on an equal footing. Americans and Asians would 
need to cooperate as human beings in reducing prejudices and chauvinistic 
excesses. Traditional geopolitics could be useful if leaders and nations 
realized that its purpose is to maintain regional balance and stability, 
not to ostracize another country as a perpetual hypothetical enemy. In 
this context, it is important to try to incorporate the Soviet Union within 
the system of Asian regional security, for otherwise the balance between 
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the USSR and the other countries would be little more than a temporary 
truce or a perpetual Cold War situation. It is evident from this sketch 
that world security is inseparable from domestic stability and health in 
each country. National and international security hinges not on military 
power in the abstract, but on the uses to which it is put, its perception 
by others, its combination with economic, political, and cultural factors, 
and its role in domestic society. To the extent that Asian security awaits 
a new definition, we should consider how each country seeks to organize 
itself for production, stability, and well-being. For the United States, 
regeneration of self-confidence through economic recovery and social 
cohesiveness seems to be an urgent task without which it would be futile to 
speak of national prestige or of national power. American perceptions of 
Asian security, then, may depend on American self-perceptions ultimately. 
Years ago, Henry L. Stimson asserted that the goal of United States foreign 
policy was "the achievement of security and peace under conditions which 
preserve to us our conceptions of liberty."13 Preservation of liberty at 
home would still seem to be the most fundamental prerequisite for devising 
a viable security policy for Asia, or for any other parts of the world. 
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Japan and the Asian Triangle 
Martin E. Weinstein 
During the last ten years, much has been written concerning the Asian 
triangle and triangular diplomacy. The basic assumption of this writing 
and analysis has been that Henry Kissinger's visit to Peking in 1971 and 
President Nixon's in 1972 transformed international politics from a bipolar 
into a triangular system. The public statements of Nixon and Kissinger 
reflect their conviction that they had called forth China as a major new 
force in international politics much in the manner of British Foreign 
Secretary Canning who claimed in 1822 that by introducing the newly 
independent Latin American republics into the European system he had 
"called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old." 
Keeping in mind the history of Latin America since 1822, the analogy 
assumes a certain ironic appropriateness. Canning's declaration was a 
clever stroke in English domestic politics, and a brilliant exercise in 
rhetoric. However, it did not transform European international politics. 
From the Japanese point of view, the idea that Asian politics or world 
politics can be usefully approached in terms of a Moscow-Peking-Washington 
triangle is immediately suspect because of the exclusion of Japan, a 
country whose industrial output for the past several years has surpassed 
that of the Soviet Union and is far greater than that of China. Most 
Japanese regard it as more realistic to approach Asian politics in terms of 
a Moscow-Peking-Washington-Tokyo quadrangle, and global affairs in terms of 
a Washington-Tokyo-NATO-OPEC-Moscow-Peking hexagon. If the Japanese were 
able to express their views in a friendly,informal way, they would probably 
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question the utility of triangles, quadrangles and hexagons for 
understanding international relations. 
For most of Japan's foreign policy community (government officials, 
Liberal-Democratic Party leaders, academic and media analysts) the Moscow-
Peking-Washington triangle does not represent a real power configuration. 
Rather it is seen as a symbol of the American effort, since the early 
1970s, to restructure Asian and global politics by dramatically improving 
Sino-American relations, thus transforming a tense, rigid, bipolar Cold War 
world into a world characterized by detente and rapprochement.2 It is 
worth recalling that for fifteen years before the 1972 Shanghai Communique 
signaled a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement, the Japanese government had urged 
and indeed undertaken relatively flexible, pragmatic policies toward Moscow 
and Peking.3 It is also important to remember that the Japanese government 
wanted to act as an intermediary between Washington and Peking, and that it 
was acutely embarrassed by Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China in the 
summer of 1971. More importantly, Japanese officials were very 
apprehensive in the early 1970s that Washington's unilateral approach to 
Peking would give the Chinese opportunities to play Washington and Tokyo 
against each other, and that the enormous strategic importance that the 
Nixon Administration publicly attributed to China would weaken Japan's 
position as America's most important ally and trading partner in Asia.* 
By the end of the 1970s, these initial concerns had faded. Although 
the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations had all trumpeted the 
fundamental historic importance of the Washington-Peking rapprochement, the 
volume of U.S.-Chinese trade remained relatively small, and strategic 
cooperation largely verbal and symbolic. At the same time Japan continued 
to be America's leading overseas trading partner and key military ally in 
Asia and the Pacific. In contrast to the early 1970s, when Chinese 
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warnings about the dangers of a revival of Japanese militarism seemed aimed 
at isolating Japan, by the end of the decade, the Chinese were encouraging 
Japanese defense efforts and cultivating the symbols, if not the reality, 
of a Peking-Tokyo-Washington alignment against Soviet "hegemony." 
As Tokyo saw it at the beginning of the 1980s, the problem with the 
American effort to create and manipulate a Moscow-Peking-Washington 
triangle was that, while allowing the American Pacific fleet and air forces 
to decline from their former position of unchallengeable superiority to one 
of numerical inferiority vis-a-vis Soviet naval and air forces in Northeast 
Asia, Washington was willing to rely excessively on China's limited 
military power to offset the Soviet military buildup in Asia. The danger, 
in Japanese eyes, was that detente, rapprochement and triangular diplomacy 
had become American rationalizations for the growing Soviet conventional 
naval and air preponderance in the Asian-Pacific region. Insofar as 
Japan's security policy, and indeed Japan's prosperity and well-being, had 
rested for three decades on an American commitment to defend Japan and, in 
a broader sense, on American maintenance of an international order in which 
Japan had secure access to resources and markets around the world, the loss 
of U.S. conventional military preponderance in the region fostered growing 
anxiety in Japan. This anxiety has not yet produced fundamental or 
dramatic changes in Japan's modest military posture or in its diplomatic 
stance in part because Tokyo is reluctant to renounce policies that have 
proven effective and inexpensive, and which represent a fragile internal 
consensus. 
In early 1981 the new Reagan Administration was talking tough to the 
Soviets, de-emphasizing the importance of Sino-American ties, reassuring 
the Japanese and South Korean governments of the firmness of U.S. military 
commitments, and urging Japan to augment its Self-Defense Forces. In 
23 
addition, the Reagan Administration called for a five-year build-up of 
American military forces, including naval and air forces in the Pacific. 
This program will take time, will require annual Congressional approval, 
and will correct the U.S.-Soviet imbalance only if it is accompanied by the 
improved competence and combat-readiness of American forces. From the 
Japanese government's perspective, therefore, this policy shift is at once 
encouraging and worrisome. If the tough talk to Moscow does not become 
excessive and provocative, and if a deliberate, long-range American 
military build-up actually materializes, a more stable, U.S.-Soviet 
military balance is likely to be the result. On the other hand, the 
Japanese regard as reckless and potentially destabilizing any approach 
which risks provoking the Soviets while failing to demonstrate clearly that 
well-armed American forces are prepared to back up the tough talk. 
In order to understand Japanese anxiety over the current military 
imbalance, as well as Japanese reluctance to do much about it, it is 
necessary to step back from current issues, and to see Japan in recent 
historical perspective. Among the major industrialized nations, Japan is 
decidedly the most resource-poor. In the crucial matter of energy,for 
example, Japan now imports more petroleum than any other country in the 
world, and depends upon foreign purchases of petroleum for nearly 70% of 
its total energy consumption--far more than either Western Europe or the 
United States. This extreme dependence upon imports extends to minerals, 
lumber, and even food. 
Japanese foreign policy makers realized by the end of the First World 
War that, while industrialization would be the basis of Japan's wealth and 
power, it would also be a source of chronic vulnerability and insecurity.5 
The more productive Japanese industry is, the more dependent it is upon 
imported fuels and raw materials. This remains true even when fuel and raw 
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material imports are a declining proportion of gross national product, 
because, while the declining proportion shows that Japan is adding 
increased value to its manufactured products, the fuels and raw materials 
remain indispensable, and their volume grows. This being the case, the 
unavoidable task of Japan's foreign policy in the 1980s--as it was in the 
1920s and the 1950s--is to maintain access to a far-flung, overseas network 
of fuel and raw materials. 
The fundamental foreign policy options for Japan, therefore, derive 
from the question of whether and how Japan can maintain this access. Japan 
must (1) control the foreign sources of energy and raw materials, or (2) be 
able to buy from those who control the sources of energy and raw materials, 
or (3) face industrial stagnation and decline. 
We have become so accustomed to living with a Japan that thrives by 
peaceful trade that we may have forgotten that the men, now in their 
fifties and sixties, who will lead Japan through this decade, clearly 
remember the disaster of World War II. They know that the war, and the 
defeat, resulted in large part from Japan's efforts to use its industrial 
might and its military forces to establish the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere, which was intended to ensure Japanese access to the coal 
and iron of Manchuria and North China, to the tin and rubber of Malaya, and 
to the petroleum of the East Indies. They know that as a consequence of 
Japan's phenomenal economic growth, its dependence upon essential imports 
has grown enormously and is now global rather than regional. For example, 
Japan now meets only 12% of its petroleum requirements from Indonesia, 
while close to 80% of its oil comes from the politically volatile Middle 
East. Moreover, the unification of China and the economic development of 
the Soviet Far East have eliminated the strategic advantages that rapid 
industrialization and superior organization conferred upon Japan in the 
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half century before the Pacific War. In fact, advances in military 
technology have rendered the narrow, densely populated Japanese islands 
extremely vulnerable to air and missile attacks, to the interdiction of 
essential sea lanes, and to wars and disruptions in areas as remote from 
Japanese control as the Persian Gulf. It is no wonder that Japan's leaders 
find it difficult to see how increasing Japan's admittedly modest Self-
Defense Forces will solve or even significantly reduce Japan's strategic 
dependence and vulnerability. 
Moreover, the men who govern Japan know that economic decline and 
stagnation are not purely theoretical alternatives. From the surrender in 
1945, until the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, they and their 
countrymen lived in extreme poverty and deprivation, with little hope that 
they would ever again see the frugal comforts that had been attained in the 
1930s. Japan's industries had been destroyed by American bombs, and its 
merchant marine virtually wiped out by American submarines. The Japanese 
had the skills to rebuild what had ben destroyed. The most serious 
obstacles to economic recovery were the blockades, embargoes and 
restrictions on Japanese overseas trade, which were imposed by the 
Occupation and by states Japan had invaded or threatened during the war. 
As a result of these obstacles, Japan, for almost five years, simply had no 
access to the resources and markets necessary for economic reconstruction. 
Not only was Japan an economic cripple in those grim years, 1945-50, 
it was also completely demilitarized, and even without adequate police 
forces to cope with riots or insurrections. Although in Japanese eyes the 
Soviet threat was not as pressing and urgent as the economic malaise, it 
had to be given serious attention. Japan's leaders wondered what was to 
become of their country when the American Occupation forces went home. The 
Soviets were not then a formidable military power in Asia, yet Stalin had 
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attempted to occupy northern Hokkaido, and had in fact occupied the 
Northern Islands, an issue which continues to this day to rankle in 
Japanese-Soviet relations. Moreover, the uncommonly large 400-man Soviet 
mission in Tokyo was busy helping the Japan Communist Party to gain control 
of the newly formed labor unions. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru was not 
alone in fearing that unless the Japanese government had adequate police 
and internal security forces and an American guarantee againt external 
aggression, Japan, following the conclusion of a peace treaty and the end 
of the Occupation, might very well be pulled into the Soviet orbit in much 
the saw way Czechoslovakia was in 1947.6 
By the time war broke out in Korea in June, 1950, American policy 
toward Japan had shifted dramatically from its original emphasis on 
demilitarization and economic punishment, to a policy of actively 
stimulating Japanese economic recovery and encouraging Japan to build at 
least limited armed forces for internal security and territorial defense. 
Most importantly, by the time Prime Minister Yoshida signed the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty and the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, 
in September 1951, it was evident to the Japanese government, and to 
economic planners and businessmen, that an alliance with the U.S., and 
alignment with the Free World offered Japan the prospect of relatively 
unfettered access to overseas sources of fuels and raw materials, access to 
the richest markets in the world, and the military protection of what were 
at the time unchallengeably preponderant American naval and air forces 
operating in the Western Pacific and from Japan itself, as well as the 
American ground forces in South Korea. 
It is worth looking back briefly to the aftermath of World War II and 
to the Occupation, because the basic lines of Japan's present foreign and 
defense policies were drawn in those years. Japan's security was then 
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perceived, and is still perceived, in both economic and military terms, 
with economics usually receiving more attention. The Soviets were, and 
still are, the principal threat. China, even in its most belligerent and 
vociferous anti-Japanese phase in the 1960s, was not seen by Japanese 
policy makers as a serious military threat--certainly not as serious a 
threat as U.S. policy makers perceived China to be. The U.S. was, and 
still is, Japan's most important trading partner, as well as the protector 
of trading routes and of Middle East oil. The American Seventh Fleet, the 
Fifth Air Force and the U.S. forces in Soth Korea remain the most important 
elements in Japan's military defense. 
Although the Sino-Soviet dispute has become a major factor in Japan's 
security environment during the last twenty years, and changes in American 
policy toward the Soviet Union and China during the past decade have given 
Japan more room to maneuver, the government of Japan has shown little 
inclination to take major initiatives or departures toward the Asian 
Communist giants. Significant developments occur from time to time, such 
as the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Peking, which followed the 
Long-Term Trade Agreement with China reached earlier that year, or Japan's 
periodic negotiations with Moscow over trade or political issues. Yet the 
impact of actions such as these on the organization of Japan's economy and 
the direction of its foreign policy are limited. Close, cooperative ties 
with Washington still take clear precedence over relations with Peking or 
Moscow; and the expansion of Japan's relations with the Russians and the 
Chinese is constrained by uncertainty about how far, how fast, and in what 
direction the Americans are moving. 
It becomes apparent upon comparison that Japan's foreign and defense 
policies have changed less during the past fifteen years than have those of 
the United States. In part, the reason is that the Japanese had less to 
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change. Their relations with Peking were never as economically restrictive 
or bitter as ours, nor did they have sizeable military forces in East Asia 
which they could withdraw. Nevertheless, the pendulum of American policy 
swings in a wider arc than does that of Japan, and the swing from Cold War 
toward detente and rapprochement, and now back toward Cold War, has gone 
further in Washington than in Tokyo. During a policy-planning conference 
of American and Japanese officials in early 1976, one Japanese--after 
discussing the limitations of Washington's openings to Moscow and Peking--
asked what the U.S. government planned to do after detente, if it were 
successful. The American officials were put off by the question. The 
senior American present explained that detente would continue indefinitely 
because there was no acceptable alternative. The Japanese nodded politely 
but skeptically. In their minds the question still remains unanswered.7 
In the 1950s and 1960s, there were pro-American, politically 
conservative Japanese, staunch defenders of the Security Treaty, who were 
concerned that American military predominance in the Western Pacific, 
combined with U.S. anti-Communist fervor and Yankee obstinacy, could lead 
to an unnecessary war with the Soviets and the Chinese--a war into which 
Japan would have been unavoidably drawn. The thrust of Japanese policy 
then was to keep the shield of the Security Treaty raised while seeing to 
it that the American sword stayed safely and unprovocatively in its sheath. 
This was the purpose of the Prior Consultation Notes appended to the 1960 
Security Treaty by the Kishi Cabinet. In the Prior Consultation Notes, the 
U.S. government agreed to consult with the government of Japan and to gain 
its approval prior to making any major changes in the force structure or 
weaponry of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan or prior to deploying these 
forces to a combat area outside Japan. 
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In 1981, the questions in the minds of Japan's ruling conservatives 
are of an entirely different order. These men are still pro-American, and 
they still support the Security Treaty, but they wonder whether the treaty 
and the American forces that stand behind it are adequate for Japan's 
defense. Given the changes that occurred in America's world outlook, in 
Congressional and bureaucratic attitudes toward overseas military 
interventions and, perhaps most importantly, given the erosion of American 
military strength in the Western Pacific, the Japanese now wonder what the 
Mutual Security Treaty will mean to the United States in the 1980s. Does 
it represent an unequivocal commitment to fight in Japan's defense, or does 
it mean something less? If so, how much less? Are the Seventh Fleet and 
the Fifth Air Force an effective deterrent against the Soviet Pacific Fleet 
and air forces? If deterrence policy fails, will American naval and air 
forces be able to keep open the lines of communication to Japan and the 
Western Pacific? What should Japan do? 
The most significant change that has occurred in Japanese foreign and 
defense policy is that moderate, cautious Japanese conservatives are now 
asking themselves these questions, not in a panicky or even urgent way, but 
deliberately and seriously. Ten or twenty years ago they did not. Then, 
they accepted American military predominance, nuclear and conventional, in 
the air and on the seas, as an unshakeable premise upon which Japanese 
policies were built. Now no one in Japan has yet proposed clear, 
convincing answers to the above questions. And in view of the demonstrated 
success and enormous inertia of existing policies, dramatic departures in 
Japanese foreign and defense policies do not appear imminent. 
Nevertheless, we should realize that fundamental changes have occurred 
in Japanese perceptions, and that perceptual changes carry the potential of 
substantial alterations in Japanese policy in the 1980s. 
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It should be noted that during the past few years, a number of 
respected writers have argued that the Japanese government has already made 
basic changes in its foreign and defense policy, or is in the process of 
doing so. These arguments are built on interpretations of the economic 
quarrels that have beset the United States and Japan, on the issues that 
have continued to divide Japan and the Soviet Union, on improvements in 
Sino-Japanese relations, and on evidence of growing Japanese involvement in 
Southeast Asia. While government spokesmen in Tokyo and Washington insist 
that their two countries have never been closer, some scholars and 
journalists tend to argue that Japan has adopted--or is adopting--basic 
policies of greater economic and political independence from the United 
States, that Japan is assuming a leadership role in Southeast Asia, and 
that Japan is moving toward extensive economic and even security ties with 
China.8 
This essay, in contrast, was written in the belief that while 
fundamental changes in Japan's foreign and defense policies are likely, 
they have not yet taken place, nor have they been decided upon by the 
Japanese government. On the contrary, the senior Liberal Democratic Party 
politicians who rule Japan are struggling to preserve as much as they can 
of the domestic and international positions Japan gained in the 1950s and 
1960s. Moreover, as the impressive and surprising Conservative victory in 
the June 1980 general elections suggests, there are no substantial domestic 
pressures that are likely to cause a major shift in foreign policy. 
Fundamental policy changes are not likely to take place incrementally; they 
are more likely to occur suddenly, should a reversal in the U.S.-Soviet 
military balance in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific be unmistakably 
brought home to the Japanese, perhaps by an American failure to honor a 
security commitment in that region. That is why this essay focuses on the 
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changing Japanese perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet military balance, which 
could shock Japan into making basic changes in its foreign and defense 
policies. 
Although it is next to impossible to pinpoint the beginnings of 
Japanese skepticism about detente, rapprochement and triangular diplomacy, 
one of the early official expressions of this skepticism occurred in 1975-
76, when the Japan Defense Agency issued its second White Paper.9 In the 
first, which had appeared in 1971, Mr. Nakasone Yasuhiro, who was then 
Director General, had called for expanded Japanese forces to fill the gap 
left by the reversion of Okinawa that year and by the reduction and 
consolidation of American forces in the Far East. His White Paper had also 
made a strong plea for heightened defense consciousness among the Japanese 
people. Mr. Nakasone had a reputation as a hawk and as an aspiring Prime 
Minister, and many Japanese viewed his White Paper as an effort at self-
promotion. In any case, it became clear in the ensuing defense budgets 
that Prime Minister Sato's Cabinet would not act on Mr. Nakasone's 
proposal. In contrast to its controversial 1971 predecessor, the 1976 
White Paper was a model of bureaucratic action and blandness. It received 
less media attention, and one is tempted to pass over it as having little 
significance for Japanese foreign and defense policy. 
There are, however, two aspects of the 19 76 White Paper that deserve 
attention. First, the preparation of the White Paper led to a revealing 
disagreement between the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Agency on the 
future strategic environment in the region.11 Second, the 1976 White Paper 
had an unprecedented and unusual set of statistical tables and charts 
appended to it. 
When the paper was drafted in the Defense Bureau of the Defense Agnecy 
in late 1975, it had a clear, consistent purpose and argument. Defense 
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Agency Director General Sakata Michita wanted to gain public approval and 
greater legitimacy for the Self-Defense Forces. The budget outlook was not 
promising, and the price of weapons was rising rapidly. Moreover, between 
1972 and 1976, personnel costs in the Defense Agency had risen from 47 
percent to 56 percent of the defense budget, while procurement outlays had 
dropped from 25 to 16 percent. In these circumstances, Mr. Sakata saw no 
likelihood of substantially improving the Defense Force's weapons and 
equipment, or even reaching the procurement goals of the modest Fourth 
Defense Plan (1972-76). Consequently, instead of clamoring for budget 
increases that were certain to be refused, he set out to gain greater 
public acceptance and legitimacy for the Defense Agency and the Self-
Defense Forces. Minister Sakata directed the Defense Bureau to prepare a 
White Paper that would reassure the opposition parties and the doves--a 
White Paper free of the mildly hawkish arguments that characterized 
previous Defense Agency publications. 
The early drafts of the White Paper took the line that Japan could 
look forward to ten years of peace and security in an era of detente. 
There was no mention of "gaps" and no discussion of U.S. force reductions. 
Despite the debacle in Saigon earlier in 1975, the United States was 
expected to continue to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and 
China. Japan would follow suit. With the major powers behaving 
peacefully, war was improbable in Korea, and the level of tension there 
would drop. Given the stable, secure international environment predicted 
in the draft, there would be no need for expensive improvements or 
expansion of the Self-Defense Forces. Instead, the draft White Paper 
proposed a modest cut in Self-Defense Forces personnel during the coming 
decade and the application of the funds freed by these cuts to a moderate 
upgrading of weapons and equipment. The new, non-demanding Defense Force, 
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in the new, safe, secure world of detente, was to be known as the "basic 
standing force." 
The thrust of Mr. Sakata's approach to the Liberal Democratic Party 
doves and the Opposition was that since he was not pushing for more 
powerful, expensive Defense Forces, it was only appropriate for these 
political critics to respond by giving the Defense Agency a more 
respectable place in Japanese political life. His suggested quid pro quo 
was the establishment of a Diet Committee on Defense. The fate of Mr. 
Sakata's extremely modest proposal for a Diet Committee on Defense is 
symptomatic of the political sensitivity and low priority that defense 
policy has in Japan. The Committee did not materialize until April 1980, 
when it was created, in part in response to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, and in part to show the suddenly aroused Carter Administration 
that Japan was becoming serious about defense questions. 
Since the draft White Paper's analysis of the international political 
trends and of Japan's strategic environment dealt with broad foreign policy 
questions, copies were sent to the Foreign Ministry. There it landed in 
the Security Treaty Division of the North American Affairs Bureau, and in 
the Research and Analysis Bureau. In both offices the draft White Paper 
was sharply criticized for being unrealistic and excessively optimistic. 
The Security Treaty Division people argued that the international political 
and strategic analysis was so completely at odds with the actual situation 
that it was beyond salvage and repair. They urged that it be completely 
rewritten to take into account what they saw as the deterioration in U.S.-
Soviet relations, the uncertainties of Chinese domestic politics and 
foreign policy, and the continuing tension and instability in the Korean 
peninsula. The Defense Agency's prediction of a ten-year period of peace 
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and security came under especially harsh criticism. It was quickly 
scrapped. 
The Research and Analysis Bureau agreed with these criticisms but felt 
that the Defense Agency's draft could be salvaged if it were revised. The 
analysts proposed a number of substantial revisions that were intended to 
balance and hedge the Defense Agency's assessments, most of which were 
incorporated into the final version of the White Paper. As a result, the 
Defense Agency was left with its "basic standing force" concept, but 
without most of the analysis and predictions that made it a logical 
response to Japan's international environment. 
Oddly enough the inter-agency hedging and balancing process did not 
extend to the tables and charts appended to the White Paper. Among these 
were a table of the "Trend of Forces Around Japan" and a chart on 
"Deployment and Basing Around Japan." The deployment and basing chart 
showed the Soviets holding an approximate 2:1 advantage in naval combat 
vessels and combat aircraft in the Western Pacific. The table on force 
trends showed that while the tonnage and numbers of Soviet naval and air 
forces in the Far East had grown by approximately 80 percent between 1965 
and 1975, those of the United States had declined by about 70 percent.12 
In brief, the figures showed a reversal of the U.S.-Soviet military balance 
around Japan, and Soviet naval and air predominance. 
There was nothing classified or secret abut these figures. Most of 
the data in the charts and tables were taken from The Military Balance, 
published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 
and from Jane's Fighting Ships. The data were consistent with statements, 
published in October 1975, by the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, in which 
Admiral James Holloway declared that the Sea of Japan had become a Soviet 
lake, and that it was uncertain whether U.S. naval and air forces could 
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keep open the lines of communication in the Pacific west of Hawaii, should 
the Soviets attempt to interdict them.13 The Defense Agency had begun to 
feed this information to the Japanese press in the autumn of 1975, together 
with reports of Soviet naval operations in the waters close to Japan. In 
the course of the Foreign Ministry-Defense Agency discussions on the draft 
White Paper, the diplomats pointed out that these data on the balance of 
military forces around Japan seemed inconsistent with the Agency's rosy 
analysis and predictions about Japan's future security. The Defense Agency 
agreed: they did seem inconsistent. The diplomats asked whether the 
reversal in the U.S.-Soviet balance might not have serious strategic 
implications for Japan. The Defense Agency replied that, based on their 
talks with U.S. defense officials, they did not believe that the actual 
shift was as dramatic as the statistics suggested, and moreover, that the 
Soviets did not intend to take any military actions in Asia and the Pacific 
against Japan and the United States. Defense Agency representatives argued 
that the main significance of the changed balance of forces around Japan 
was, as they put it, more political and diplomatic than military. 
The Defense Agency's draft analyses and predictions were based on 
President Nixon's 1972 and 1973 Foreign Policy Reports, and on discussions 
held in 1973-1975 with Defense Department and State Department officials. 
As the Japanese diplomats pointed out, however, by late 1975 and early 
1976, when the White Paper was being revised, Secretary of State 
Kissinger's statements on U.S.-Soviet relations had become decidedly less 
optimistic. The debacle in Saigon had contributed to this change. So had 
the Soviet-Cuban intevention in Angola. SALT had bogged down, and so had 
U.S. discussions to normalize relations with Peking. And President Gerald 
Ford was preparing to present Congress with the first real defense budget 
increases since 1969. 
36 
The table on the "Trend of Forces Around Japan" and the chart on 
"Deployment and Basing Around Japan" were published, without alteration or 
comment, with the White Paper. In a conversation with a Foreign Ministry 
official who participated in its preparation, I asked whether he and his 
colleagues had thought of explaining the alarming statistical data in the 
analytical section of the White Paper. The official smiled and said, 
"Certainly not. You know what is in those tables. What could we have 
said? We could have quibbled with some of the numbers, or gotten into a 
discussion of Soviet intentions, but that would only have made it worse. 
We would end up looking ridiculous if we tried to make that data harmless. 
Although the American Asian-Pacific military forces have not increased 
in tonnage or in numbers of vessels or aircraft, since 1975 a modest 
modernization program has improved their quality. Several new Spruance-
class destroyers, Perry-class guided missile frigates, Los Angeles-class 
nuclear attack submarines, and Tarawa-Class amphibious assault ships have 
been added to the Seventh Fleet. Within the next few years, four of the 
six aircraft carriers in the Seventh Fleet will have replaced their F-4 
Phantom fighters with F-14 Tomcats, and the Air Force Tactical Fighter Wing 
on Okinawa will be equipped entirely with F-15 Eagles.14 The Reagan 
Administration plans to accelerate and expand this program, possibly to 
include the construction of a new, nuclear powered aircraft carrier for the 
Seventh Fleet.15 
This modest trend in U.S. force deployments in the Asian-Pacific 
region, however, has been more than offset in Japanese eyes by two negative 
factors. The hostage crisis in Iran and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
led the Carter Administration to suddenly create what appears to be a 
permanent U.S. naval and air presence in the Indian Ocean, intended to 
stabilize the Persian Gulf region, and to convince the Soviets of the 
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seriousness of American commitment in the Gulf. Since Japan is more 
dependent on Middle East petroleum than either the U.S. or Western Europe, 
the Japanese government favors these U.S. deployments, and devoutly hopes 
they will produce the desired results. At the same time, however, the 
Japanese know that the American build-up in the Indian Ocean has been made 
by transferring vessels and aircraft previously stationed in the Western 
Pacific, thus further weakening U.S. capabilities around Japan and Korea. 
Moreover, during the past three years, the Soviets have significantly 
augmented their naval and air forces around Japan.16 Following the signing 
of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1978, the 
Soviets ostentatiously reinforced their garrisons on the disputed Northern 
Islands. Since the Sino-Vietnamese fighting of February and March 1979, 
Soviet naval vessels and aircraft on the Pacific-Indian Ocean run have made 
full and regular use of the facilities at Camranh Bay and at Da Nang Air 
Base. In 1979, the new Kiev-class aircraft carrier Minsk joined the Soviet 
Pacific Fleet, together with a larger-than-usual complement of new missile 
armed cruisers, nuclear submarines and supply ships. By the end of 1980, 
this increase had pushed the total of Soviet naval combat tonnage in_the 
Western Pacific from the 1.2 million tons of 1975 up to 1.52 million tons. 
Soviet missile forces in the Far East have been reinforced by new SS-
20 MIRVed missiles. Perhaps the most significant new addition to the 
Soviet Far Eastern forces, however, is the Backfire bomber, a variable 
wing, twin-engined craft with a speed between 2.25 and 2.5, designed to 
operate effectively in both low and high altitude missions, and possessing 
an estimated combat range of 3,100 nautical miles, without refueling. 
Approximately ten Backfires have already been stationed in the Far East, 
and U.S. intelligence sources anticipate that between 50 and 60 Backfires 
will be on station by 1984. Deployment of the Backfires to the Pacific 
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Fleet will pose a severe threat to Western shipping and to U.S. carrier 
task forces anywhere in the Western Pacific, adding to the already powerful 
threat from the large number of Soviet submarines. Given the reliance of 
the U.S. on sea routes for maintenance, supply and reinforcement of its 
forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and given Japan's almost total 
dependence on sea routes, the military balance around Japan appears to have 
become even more fragile and unstable than it was in the mid-1970s. 
Finally, it should be noted that there is another long-range factor 
that suggests that the Soviet strategic position in the Far East will 
continue to grow stronger throughout the remainder of this century. That 
factor is the construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) Railway and 
its feeder lines, which will substantially improve communications between 
the European and Asiatic regions and will probably further stimulate the 
economic development of the Soviet Maritime Provinces. 
There is little evidence that improved relations between Tokyo and 
Peking, and Washington and Peking, are compensating adequately for the 
continued Soviet build-up in Asia and the Pacific. China's forces are 
largely equipped with aging, obsolete weapons. However, the Chinese have 
been reluctant to become dependent on American weapon imports, while the 
U.S., despite sporadic gestures to the contrary, is wary of selling weapons 
to China. Moreover, even if both sides were to suddenly decide that China 
should be armed by the U.S., the enormity of China's weapon requirements 
would probably be greater than the American arms industry could meet. One 
likely result would be a marginal and provocative Chinese military 
augmentation that would increase the likelihood of Sino-Soviet hostilities 
without improving China's chances of success. 
There has been an increase in economic relations with China during the 
past few years, which has been profitable and encouraging to the China 
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traders in both the U.S. and Japan. Given the size and population of 
China, the scale of its economic problems, and China's relatively limited 
ability to absorb and make effective use of advanced technology and machine 
imports, these economic ties with the U.S. and Japan are not likely to 
dramatically transform China's economic and strategic position during the 
1980s. 
Although the Sino-Soviet dispute unquestionably diverts Soviet forces 
from possible deployment in Europe, the Middle East, or elsewhere in the 
world, Japanese officials have come to believe that the strategic 
significance of the Sino-Soviet dispute tends to be exaggerated in American 
eyes. Ten years ago, when the Soviet forces were approximately half their 
present strength, and when the extent of the American military decline was 
not anticipated, it was easier to draw comfort from the Sino-Soviet 
dispute, and to view the Chinese as an effective counter-weight to the 
Soviets in Asia. By the beginning of the 1980s, however, the Soviet build-
up in Asia and the Pacific, which may have begun as a defensive reaction to 
what Moscow saw as a Chinese threat, had assumed offensive, destabilizing 
proportions, not only against China, but against Japan as well. Awareness 
of the changed strategic balance in the region has led to greater 
willingness in both Tokyo and Washington to plan for military cooperation 
against the Soviets. It remains to be seen, however, whether the ships, 
aircraft and well-trained forces necessary to make this cooperation 
effective will materialize. 
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China and the Security of Asia* 
Jonathan D. Pollack 
Introduction 
In a seminal essay written nearly three decades ago, Arnold Wolfers 
described national security as an "ambiguous symbol" laden with a broad 
range of objective and subjective connotations. The intevening years have 
not diminished the value of his insights. Then as now, judgments about the 
security (or insecurity) of nations derive from far more than the 
accumulations and exercise of military power. No doubt this particular 
consideration retains a certain singularity in any assessment of 
international relations, yet so much more is involved in such a complex 
equation. The complicated interaction between the deterrence of armed 
conflict and the need to defend against actual physical attack in its 
various potential forms; the determination of what precise values and 
interests--economic, political, diplomatic, as well as military--need to be 
secured, at what cost, and with what degree of risk; a recognition of the 
continuing "security dilemma" between nations, where one nation's actions 
may contribute substantially to perceptions of threat on the part of 
others; and the role of national security objectives in relation to 
bureaucratic power within nations all constitute recurring issues for 
poltical and military leadership alike. 
Despite the timeless quality of these issues, there is a renewed 
salience to these considerations in the 1980s. Such a phenomenon is 
*A11 opinions expressed in this essay are the author's own, and 
should not be attributed to the Rand Corporation or any of its governmen-
tal sponsors. 
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readily discernible in the United States, but it is highly visible in Asia, 
as well. Notwithstanding the centrality of Europe in the post-war alliance 
structure and the international security system as a whole, it has been 
principally in Asia where the lines of demarcation have been far more 
fluid, and hence more the object of great power contention and conflict. 
Other than the Middle East, Asia has been the principal locale of the hot 
wars of the past three or more decades which have centrally and recurrently 
affected the global distribution of power. For good or for ill, these 
conflicts have involved the security and diplomatic interests of the United 
States. The roster, while well-known, is worth recounting: the triumph of 
Communism on the Chinese mainland; the Korean War; the prolonged agonies of 
Indochina; and contemporary conflicts in Afghanistan and Kampuchea are 
among the principle entries on this historical record. 
Indeed, what to many Americans seems like eons ago, it appeared in the 
mid-1970s that the United States had generally decided to reduce its 
external obligations and pull back from a policy once termed the 
"globalization of containment." An overall war weariness derived from the 
divisions and agonies of Vietnam accelerated dramatically with the collapse 
of the non-Communist governments in Cambodia and South Vietnam in the 
spring of 1975. The Carter Administration's early determination to proceed 
with the withdrawal of the remaining ground forces from South Korea seemed 
to flow inexorably from such developments, as well. In the early 1980s, 
however, political, economic, and military circumstances appear profoundly 
different; some of these factors are worthy of brief mention. 
First, there is a vastly enhanced appreciation of the long-term 
American stake in Asia. In economic terms, the remarkable economic growth 
in various neo-Confucian cultures--felt initially in Japan, but now also 
extending to South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, to name the 
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more prominent examples—has transformed long-existing trade patterns. 
Trade between the United States and East Asia has outstripped U.S.trade 
with Western Europe since the mid-1970s; this trend is all but certain to 
become even more pronounced in the coming decade. The expectations within 
these societies of a continued, stable U.S. presence (in both political and 
military terms) has also increased rather than diminished, as has American 
awareness of these expectations. The new pattern of relations between the 
United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), while first evident 
at the outset of the 1970s, accelerated dramatically in the waning years of 
the decade, with the United States increasingly (and publicly) committed to 
the long-term goal of "a strong and secure China." Inasmuch as U.S. ties 
with Peking also presuppose a vigorous American involvement in Asia, there 
seems even less likelihood of a diminished U.S. role in this region. 
Second, the unquestioned growth in Soviet political and military power 
in Asia and the increasing extension of the Sino-Soviet lines of cleavage 
to Asian regional disputes have placed the security issues of the area in a 
strikingly different light. Many observers have noted that military power 
appears to be the central (and, some would argue, the exclusive) instrument 
of Soviet influence in East Asia. The cementing of Soviet-Vietnamese ties 
in 1978 and Moscow's subsequent access to the naval and air facilities in 
Vietnam, along with a further enhancing of Soviet ground, naval, air, and 
strategic assets deployed to Northeast Asia, underscore this increased 
presence. Judgments about the effectiveness of these forces in enhancing 
Soviet political objectives in the region remain far less certain, but the 
salience of these considerations for various regional actors (not to 
mention the United States) has increased measurably. 
A third factor (related to both previous considerations) is 
intellectual as much as political: a significant degree of revisionism in 
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judging the relevance of military power in contemporary international 
politics. If for a time increasing emphasis was devoted to the notion of 
global issues (for example, energy and North-South relations) transcending 
the traditional agenda of international relations, this view has now been 
supplanted if not wholly discarded. It has become increasingly clear that 
"power oriented" views of the international system as well as "value 
oriented" approaches are inextricably intertwined. No doubt the renewed 
attention to the role of military power testifies to the passage of time 
from the traumas of the Vietnam era. Yet it also reflects a heightened 
awareness that in the elite political cultures of other key global actors 
(notably, both the USSR and the PRC), prevailing attitudes about the 
accumulation and use of military force remain profoundly different. To 
leaders in both Moscow and Peking, the existence of military strength 
(irrespective of the economic constraints evident in both societies) is 
inseparable from the maintenance and enhancement of national power. 
Military power and interstate conflict are thus perceived not as 
abberrational phenomena, but integral to the dynamics of the international 
system. This is not to suggest that all leaders in the USSR and PRC are 
thinly disguised militarists, but that the accumulation of military power 
has had a singular and recurring importance in the historical experiences 
of both elites. Such considerations are given a far more serious hearing 
today than they were only a few years ago. 
Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, hindsight suggests that the 
events of 1975 represented a beginning, not an end. A coincidence of 
domestic and external trends, especially those involving China, set new 
international patterns in motion whose consequences continue to be felt 
today. Vietnam's consolidation of power throughout most of Indochina; Deng 
Xiaoping's momentary consolidation of power within China (interrupted by 
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the convulsive events of 1976); and a sense of profound strategic change in 
the superpower relationship all contributed to an admittedly inchoate 
impression of historic realignment in global political and military 
relations. To gain a degree of perspective on these tumultuous changes, we 
need to turn briefly to the concept of strategy and its relation to China's 
national security. 
Global Strategy and Chinese Security in the 1980s 
The renewed salience of national security (both as a political and 
intellectual issue) has heightened attention on the subject of strategic 
thought. Indeed, Chinese insistence that international events be evaluated 
from "the higher plane of global strategy" has contributed significantly to 
this awareness. Long-standing Chinese traditions of strategy and 
statecraft (not to mention a Marxist-Leninist frame of reference) stand in 
marked contrast to an American preference for "logic of the situation" 
analysis. To the Chinese, issues of strategy and security are best 
understood as a process, not a terminal policy objective. PRC writings 
suggest that we cannot freeze events in time and place, since this lends a 
far too static quality to what are always highly dynamic international 
processes. 
Chinese analysts and policymakers alike, however, still seem reluctant 
to depart from the global logic underlying their strategic pronouncements 
and define a more explicit regional identity and posture. Does this 
suggest modesty or uncertainty on their part about China's prospective 
international role in the 1980s? While there is a certain comfort in 
assuming a largely reactive stance in relation to global political and 
military trends, one suspects that China protests too much in this regard. 
To acknowledge a more explicit and even pivotal identity and posture would 
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draw the PRC into the maelstrom of great power activity that Peking long 
tried to avoid. Although the PRC has in the past sought to insulate itself 
against global strategic trends, China has been a central participant in 
most of the major transformations of the international system since the end 
of the Second World War. We do not need to review this historical record 
to appreciate that China has long been a key factor—and as a player, not a 
"card"--in global as well as regional politics. No state has system-
transforming capabilities comparable to China's. The test for China in the 
1980s, therefore, will be to devise a regional security perspective which 
pays heed to both China's limits and potentialities as a political and 
military actor, seeking somehow to combine the strategic imperatives 
worrisome to Peking with the more immediate consequences of China's role as 
the dominant (if not dominating) Asian power. 
In the coming decade, therefore, China will be increasingly compelled 
to assess its role as a regional power. It is in Asia that the PRC has 
engaged in armed conflict, sought to avoid encirclement and isolation, and 
has proven capable of exerting substantial influence in relation to other 
states. The goal of securing a regional environment supportive of Chinese 
policy directions remains central to PRC strategic planning, all the more 
so given China's absence of "global reach." Yet this goal requires a set 
of differentiated responses and actions in relation to other powers. They 
range from cultivating growing diplomatic and security bonds with the West 
and Japan and assuring predictable, long-term sources of economic and 
technical assistance for China's overall modernizaton effort, to winning 
friends and influencing people among the smaller states of Asia who must 
live in the shadow of both Soviet and Chinese power and seeking to pressure 
or intimidate others defiant of Chinese expectations and solicitations. 
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The range and complexity of these issues complicate these tasks 
considerably. 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Chinese in certain 
respects have been so circumspect in publicly defining a security strategy 
for the 1980s. Even the central preoccupation on this policy agenda--the 
long-term Sino-Soviet political and military competition--remains subject 
to considerable ambiguity and diversity in leadership opinion. The Chinese 
are only too aware of the consequences of a debilitating frontal military 
confrontation with the Soviet Union--a confrontation, moreover, that Peking 
(in purely physical terms) cannot possibly hope to dominate. Leaders in 
the PRC also remain highly mindful that what Liddell Hart termed the 
"indirect approach" to strategy far more effectively serves the interests 
of the weaker, more vulnerable power. The Chinese remember only too well 
that the U.S. threat to China was ultimately removed without China having 
to fire as much as a single shot; an equivalent long-term logic may well 
pertain vis-a-vis the USSR. 
Other tasks also confront Peking in formulating and achieving the goals 
of a more powerful and secure China. China's emergence as a modern major 
power in world and regional politics cannot be pursued independent of a 
range of economic and political factors, both at home and abroad. The 
overall character of China's relations with the outside world--whether with 
adversaries or with friends--will continue to exert a pivotal influence on 
the scope, pace, and direction of the PRC's modernization effort. Indeed, 
the relative political fortunes (or misfortunes) of various Chinese leaders 
seem certain to be strongly affected by the degree of success in China's 
programs for national economic development. Pursuit of these programs will 
depend on China's adversarial relations not degenerating into open-ended 
military conflicts. At the same time, China must seek to develop long-term 
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relations with external political and economic forces (both states and 
multinational institutions) which will facilitate Peking's effort at 
enhancing its indigenous manpower and management capabilities and in 
improving upon the present levels of its agricultural, industrial, and 
defense technology. 
Such objectives are readily discernible in China's effort of recent 
years to secure "a long-term peaceful international environment" within 
which to pursue national development goals. The leadership's commitment 
reflects a decision to buy time rather than race against it. As 
acknowledged by the Chinese in their own writings, the nation must avoid 
the more heated (and even frenzied) pursuit of various development goals, 
since this approach more often than not has contributed to China's repeated 
shortcomings in economic development. A siege mentality seems incompatible 
with a more measured, orderly effort to rectify the extraordinary 
difficulties confronting Peking's economic planners. 
No matter what the political atmosphere accompanying this modernization 
effort, China's bureaucratic and political groupings cannot be expected to 
share equally in the results of these policies. While only a small circle 
of institutional interests could possibly have stood to gain from the 
convulsive politics of the 1960s and much of the 1970s, the available 
political and budgetary resources remain limited, and thus the object of 
continued political competition within China. Nowhere is this more 
apparent than among military policymakers. As a consequence both of 
China's economic retrenchment and Peking's political and diplomatic 
successes, the exclusively military element in China's national security 
equation has diminished considerably. The military leadership, disgruntled 
by their reduced political role in recent years, have been given little 
choice but to accept a subordinate status in China's modernization effort. 
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Yet China's generals remain all too aware of the shortcomings of 
Peking's armed forces in terms of logistics, organization, training, and 
readiness. Deficiencies in weaponry and the parallel need to upgrade 
Chinese approaches to military doctrine are of potentially even greater 
magnitude: they can only be rectified by the infusion of major resources 
(institutional as well as budgetary) for a sustained period of time. If 
the likelihood of major armed conflict is judged slight, the political 
justification for greater and more immediate attention to China's military 
needs is judged less compelling than competing organizational and economic 
priorities. Indeed, however foreboding the tenor of many recent Chinese 
strategic writings, several conclusions are incontestable. According to 
Peking, the Soviet Union's pursuit of "world hegemony" is waged by 
political as much as by military means; at the same time, the immediate 
military challenge to China is considered far less pressing than the Soviet 
threat in the more vulnerable, unstable areas, notably Afghanistan and 
Kampuchea. As a consequence of these and related judgments, China's 
dominant political forces have greatly diminished the voice and weight of 
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) high command. The appearance of non-
military figures at the highest levels of the military leadership (notably, 
Geng Biao's designation as Minister of National Defense and Yang Shangkun's 
appointment as Secretary General of the Party's Military Commission) lends 
further credence to these developments. 
Nevertheless, it seems premature to relegate the exclusively military 
element of Chinese national security policy to a lower status within China 
for the duration of this decade. China's immediate security environment 
could turn more confrontational, or could be judged so imbalanced as to 
require more urgent efforts at rectifying the deficiencies in the Chinese 
armed forces. Defense policymakers, perhaps persuaded that their own needs 
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have been deemphasized to the point of neglect, could again assert their 
interests far more vocally. Indeed, they may well insist that their 
continued acquiescence to current policy priorities sooner or later must 
require compensation in terms of heightened attention to their specific 
concerns and budgetary requirements. To justify the risks engendered by 
China's "tilt" toward the United States (for example, the risk of an 
indefinite prolongation of the Chinese civil war), Deng Xiaoping and his 
allies must persuade China's high command that they stand to benefit 
substantially by this policy, as well. Under circumstances where U.S. 
policy has been more favorably disposed toward the transfer of sensitive 
defense technology to the PRC, the Chinese armed forces could in time 
derive substantial benefits from this relationship. Finally, with Deng's 
ultimate passing from the political scene, it may prove far more difficult 
for his designated successors to maintain as firm a grip on the overall 
directions of national security policy. 
These observations suggest that unduly rigid demarcations between 
China's internal and external policymaking obscure a much more complicated 
political dynamic. Rarified discussions of global strategy bear directly 
on the allocation of scarce resources; more generally, they evaluate the 
nature of the contemporary international situation and the policies they 
permit or support. Chinese economic planners in particular benefit by a 
relatively benign (or at least not overly threatening) external 
environment, since it enables pursuit of China's developmental objectives 
unfettered by worries that war might be imminent or unavoidable. Thus, 
assessments of China's security environment (global as well as regional) 
assume an ongoing salience, and not only for the Chinese high command. To 
assess these issues further, we need to turn our attention briefly to the 
politics of the Sino-Soviet-American "triangle." 
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The Superpowers and China's National Security 
China's highly political conception of national security finds its most 
concrete and significant expression in the PRC's complicated dealings with 
the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, for all of Peking's 
declaratory contempt for a world dominated by two superpowers, it is not 
entirely clear whether the Chinese are all that troubled by such 
circumstances. To the extent that Washington and Moscow remain powers 
distinct from all others locked in a long-term competition on a global 
basis, their rivalry deflects political and military pressure that either 
(or both) might otherwise direct against China. Since the initial 
breakthroughs in U.S.-Chinese relations of the early 1970s, the Chinese 
have been only too aware of how such "contention" could be turned to 
China's advantage. The dilemma, as always, has been to cast China as an 
important but not pivotal factor in the Soviet-American competition, 
thereby positioning China as an independent strategic asset whose power 
could develop apart from the superpower fray. 
Toward the end of the 1970s, however, the assumptions in the logic of a 
strategic triangle began to prove more questionable. The issue of 
whether China could in fact stand apart from the global competition was 
increasingly challenged by a Soviet effort to heighten both political and 
military pressure against the PRC, while U.S.-Chinese relations foundered 
on domestic uncertainties and instabilities in both systems. Equally 
significant, the commitment of Mao and others to a largely autarkic 
conception of economic development resulted in China falling even farther 
behind world levels of economic, scientific, and educational achievement. 
Under the aegis of Deng Xiaoping (and with increasing American interest in 
facilitating the advancement of China's defense and development), Peking 
justified a burgeoning relationship with the United States as both a 
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strategic and economic necessity. The "united front" logic pursued so 
assiduously by the Chinese meant that Washington and Moscow could no longer 
be deemed co-equal threats to global or regional stability. It also 
assumed that the United States and other Western powers could serve as 
dependable sources of economic and technological assistance for China 
(including the defense sector) in the face of a growing Soviet challenge. 
China, in effect, yet again had chosen to "lean to one side," and on 
equally compelling grounds of national security and economic development as 
had governed the Sino-Soviet alliance of the early 1950s. 
Yet the resurrection of a united front strategy in recent years does 
not mean that the stark bipolarity of the early Cold War era will 
characterize the international system of the 1980s. Even as the Chinese 
insist that their dealings with the West are of a strategic, long-term 
nature, it is only too apparent that political and diplomatic alignments in 
the coming decade will remain highly fluid. The PRC leadership has 
consistently indicated that its conception of an anti-Soviet security 
coalition remains informal rather than highly institutionalized. Based on 
Peking's unhappy experiences with Moscow in decades past, a "never again" 
mentality pervades Chinese security planning. China will therefore avoid 
an overly dependent, entangling alliance with the U.S., no matter how 
substantial the seeming benefits of this relationship to the PRC. As the 
recent tensions surrounding the Taiwan issue suggest, misconceptions or 
reversals in various national policies continue to place limits on a fuller 
American and Chinese security relationship. At the same time, both Peking 
and Washington (for somewhat different reasons) share an interest in 
avoiding any direct military confrontation with the USSR. Thus, both 
elites remain aware that the scope of their dealings will be closely 
followed in Moscow. Even as Peking and Washington seek to move forward in 
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their relationship, they do not wish to take steps that preclude more 
positive relations with the Soviet Union when and if separate national 
interests could benefit by such a change. 
These observations are not intended to slight the very real gains for 
Peking as well as Washington in closer (if not wholly intimate) U.S.-
Chinese relations. Both leaderships benefit substantially by no longer 
having to plan seriously for war against each other; both can and do 
facilitate parallel security objectives in Asia, in particular countering 
the expansion of Soviet power. Indeed, it is increasingly clear that 
Chinese expectations of the U.S. may have less to do with the direct 
assistance America might provide for China's defense modernization and more 
to do with assuring a stable, predictable American political-military role 
in a manner consonant with Chinese policy goals. At the same time, the 
United States benefits by China turning its attention to the tasks of 
internal reconstruction, with Peking's concomitant effort to secure 
positive ties with most of the smaller states along its periphery. 
In practical terms, however, some of the limits of an American-Chinese 
security relationship become more evident. The United States remains 
mindful that numerous states in Asia continue to voice concern that the 
U.S. might become overly identified with the growth of Chinese power, which 
could prove detrimental to various regional actors. Notwithstanding 
heightened U.S. willingness to transfer critical defense technologies to 
China, regional sensitivities thus set limits on the scope and pace of such 
transfers. At the same time, Chinese budgetary and manpower deficiencies 
will constrain both Peking's capacities to purchase significant quantities 
of equipment and the PRC's capability to absorb and fully utilize such 
technology. Perhaps most critically, however, China's steadfast insistence 
on maintaining control over its defense planning and programs will set 
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limits on the types of technologies to which China might gain access and 
the manner of their transfer. Leaders in Peking have consistenly indicated 
that their principal interest is in upgrading their defense industrial 
structure, not in purchasing significant quantities of "off-the-shelf" 
weaponry. Yet transfer of such means of production raises extremely 
sensitive issues related to the potential end uses of advanced technology. 
Whether and how the PRC might be willing to accede to U.S. insistence on 
end use guarantees on various items and technologies speaks to central 
issues of Chinese sovereignty and autonomy. To prove overly yielding to 
the U.S. on this issue would be exceptionally risky for any Chinese leader, 
all the more so when the U.S. (in Peking's view) has been equivocating on 
its earlier commitments to the principle of one China. 
Thus, it is shared concern over the growth of Soviet power which more 
than any other factor continues to draw China and America together. 
Undeniably, the globalization of the Soviet political-military role has 
placed the USSR's position as an Asian power in a different light. At the 
close of the 1970s, Soviet actions throughout Asia--in Afghanistan, in 
Southeast Asia, along the Sino-Soviet border, on the territories disputed 
with Japan, and in the Pacific--had greatly accelerated the development 
which Moscow feared the most: the coalescence of an anti-Soviet security 
coalition in Asia paralleling (if not duplicating) the U.S. alliance with 
Western Europe. Under such circumstances, historic Soviet concerns about a 
two-front war have grown substantially. 
Indeed, the Chinese have recurrently raised the issue of whether Soviet 
military power is best judged an indication of strength or weakness. 
Increasing Soviet assets tied down in Asia as well as Europe, but with 
questionable political gains; a heightened strategic and naval rivalry with 
the United States; continuing problems in Eastern Europe along with a live 
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if limited war in Afghanistan; and major aid commitments to Cuba and 
Vietnam all suggest the growing "burdens of empire" which the USSR must 
address in the context of declining economic growth rates, growing ethnic 
tensions, and an impending leadership transition. 
Can this reliance on what Liddell Hart terms the "acquisitive approach" 
to grand strategy be sustained throughout the 1980s? Chinese strategic 
thinkers seem somewhat divided or at least unceratin about this pivotal 
question. To the extent that Soviet leadership calculations can be 
influenced by the actions of others, however, the dominant view in Peking 
sees an urgent need to constrain and complicate the unfettered exercise of 
Soviet power or the actions of those deemed Soviet surrogates. According 
to Chinese officials, this need is particularly critical in the cases of 
Afghanistan and Kampuchea, since consolidation or legitimation of a direct 
or indirect Soviet presence in either location involves direct gains for 
Moscow's power in areas where its influence had previously been more 
limited. The contrast between Soviet activity in these areas and 
continuing instabilities in Eastern Europe is obvious, but worth noting. 
Thus, when and if the Soviet Union moves more decisively to reverse the 
pattern of events in Poland, Chinese leaders would appropriately view such 
actions as reasserting Soviet hegemony in an area where Moscow has long 
been the predominant power. Potential gains for the Soviet Union in Asia, 
however, are in geographic locations immediately proximate to China. They 
would also represent very real transfers of political "real estate" in 
Moscow's long-term effort to encircle the PRC. 
Thus, the interpretation of Soviet political-military strategy (in both 
global and Asian terms) has assumed a pivotal importance for China's 
leaders in the 1980s. Chinese strategic assessment, as noted in a previous 
section, focuses on the evaluation of long-term capabilities, constraints, 
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goals, and calculations, rather than short-term planning. For the 
foreseeable future, therefore, the Chinese have a vital stake in avoiding 
the outbreak of major war. It is difficult to see how leaders in Peking 
would possibly benefit by such an event. By instead seeking to deflect 
direct Soviet pressure against China and by continuing to assert that 
Soviet power is directed most immediately against nations and regions far 
more vulnerable to penetration than the PRC, Peking hopes to create a 
situation of neither war nor peace. The deferral of more rapid acquisition 
of fully modernized defense capabilities and the concentration on the long-
term rehabilitation of the Chinese economy represent steps that are not 
lost upon decision-makers in the USSR. Thus, in the continuing "great 
game" between Moscow and Peking, both elites could well see the benefits in 
a modulated long-term political and military competition, irrespective of 
underlying historical, racial, or territorial conflicts. 
Such judgments no doubt contrast with a widespread view that Sino-
Soviet differences and hostilities are so widespread and deep-seated as to 
preclude reasonable state-to-state relations. A fuller picture of the 
long-term Sino-Soviet rivalry thus contains elements of both a wider (and 
often strident) political competition in both the Communist and non-
Communist world as well as the narrower sphere of interstate relations. If 
the immediate Soviet threat to China can be ameliorated by political and 
diplomatic means and by judicious, non-provocative steps to enhance China's 
military power, political sentiment in both capitals could coalesce around 
a less confrontational posture in Sino-Soviet relations. Even under 
present circumstances, "rules of the game" have evolved whereby leaders in 
Moscow and Peking have chosen not to test the stability of the Sino-Soviet 
deterrence equation. The emergence of such tacit restraints over the past 
decade has surely not been lost on military planners in either capital. 
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As the Chinese recurrently suggest, therefore, there is no single 
undifferentiated "Soviet threat" upon which all those states deemed part of 
the "anti-hegemony united front" can agree to act in concert. According to 
Peking, the imperatives prevailing in one region can differ markedly with 
circumstances elsewhere. It is thus hardly surprising that the Chinese see 
their interests best served by informal security arrangements with the 
West, since none of the involved parties is bound to highly explicit 
responsibilities and expectations. By instead seeking common or parallel 
ground on specific issues and actions, and on largely bilateral terms, the 
encumbrances of more rigid, formalized security ties can thereby be 
avoided. As a consequence, China's freedom of action--political as well as 
military-will remain considerable, particularly within those areas where 
Chinese military power is more likely to be employed. Some of these 
considerations become apparent by turning attention to Peking's emergent 
regional security environment. 
The Regional Security Environment 
China's understandable preoccupation with the Soviet-American rivalry 
and Peking's relations with both superpowers obscures a more immediate 
issue: the PRC's present and future role in East Asia. It is frequently 
noted that China (with respect to most conventional measures of great power 
status) will remain a regional rather than global power throughout the 
coming decade. To the smaller states which must live in the shadow of 
Chinese power, Peking can only continue to be a source of long-term 
concern, no matter how backward China might appear in comparison to the 
advanced industrial states. Thus, China's growing voice and activities in 
world politics and the all but certain enhancement of Chinese industrial 
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and military power, now abetted by Western assistance, will serve as 
pivotal factors in the Asian political-military environment of the 1980s. 
These considerations assume increased urgency in the context of renewed 
great power rivalry in Asia evident toward the end of the 1970s. 
Notwithstanding the growing political and economic autonomy of various 
states in the region, it is only too apparent that further polarization in 
Asia threatens these developments. To these emerging regional powers, 
Asian security should be cast neither in narrow military terms nor as 
simply the extension of great power competition from other areas. The 
Chinese, however, have yet to articulate a view of regional developments 
which considers fully the implicatons of this growing devolution of 
national power. By continuing to cast regional security not in Asian but 
in global terms, the Chinese leadership avoids or ignores issues of 
paramount concern to states along China's periphery. 
Foremost among these considerations is whether China will assume an 
increasingly assertive role as Asia's foremost military power. Though 
China continues to depict its military role as purely defensive in intent 
and action, it is doubtful that many observers in Asia are reassured by 
such claims. This is not to suggest that Peking will soon or suddenly 
embark upon a classic expansionist role for achieving its security 
objectives. The economic and political benefits of the indirect approach 
to strategy discussed earlier are all too obvious to leaders who wish to 
restrain the demands of the defense sector on the Chinese economy as a 
whole. Moreover, the PRC leadership understands how rapidly it could 
fritter away its political gains in Asia by resorting more fully to the use 
of military power. 
Yet certain facts remain inescapable. In absolute terms, China's 
armed forces already constitute one of the world's most imposing military 
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establishments. When key Chinese interests have been threatened in the 
past, the PRC has shown little hesitancy about resorting to force to 
achieve its political ends. The PRC leadership continues to voice concern 
about a number of such issues, with China not only retaining the military 
option, but steadily if slowly improving on its military assets. When the 
prospect of considerable access to Western technological assistance is 
added to this picture, it is hardly surprising that Chinese pledges of 
defensive intent are greeted with suspicion in many other Asian capitals. 
China's troubled dealings with Vietnam in recent years offer some 
instinctive examples in this regard. Without seeking to apportion 
responsibility to either Peking or Hanoi for the rapid and remarkable 
deterioration in interstate relations, both elites saw fit to rely on 
highly coercive approaches (Vietnam in Kampuchea and China against Vietnam) 
to achieve their goals of countering each other's power. The Chinese, 
however, have from the first insisted that their actions have nothing to do 
with regional power rivalries or the creation of a Chinese sphere of 
influence in Southeast Asia. In an ironic transposition from the mid-1960s 
(when U.S. officials argued that Vietnam was a cat's paws for Chinese 
revolutionary expansionism), Peking argues that Vietnam is a pure and 
simple accomplice of the USSR. By designating Vietnam as the "lesser 
hegemonist," the PRC has thereby been able to depict its avowedly punitive 
policies as directed not against Hanoi, but against Moscow. Not 
surprisingly, such a distinction may be readily lost upon other nations in 
the area, many of whom view Chinese actions in a far less benign light. 
The crossing of national boundaries with large numbers of troops--however 
brief Chinese operations may have been--conveys a very potent message about 
China's willingness and ability to act forcefully. 
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More broadly, China's overall strategy towards Vietnam aims at Hanoi's 
international isolation and economic and military exhaustion. It thus 
increases rather than decreases Vietnam's dependence upon the Soviet Union, 
providing Moscow with new opportunities to exercise its influence on the 
region. China's approach is based on a belief that the leadership in Hanoi 
will respond only to pressure and punishment. In view of the intransigence 
of leaders in both Hanoi and Peking and the history of Indochina over the 
past three and a half decades, it is doubtful in the extreme that such an 
approach will contribute to a reasonable political settlement in the area. 
Moreover, if China's strategy toward Vietnam should succeed, its 
principal long-term consequence would be to provide Peking with a decisive 
say in the affairs of Southeast Asia. Even now, the affiliations of the 
non-Communist nations in the area have become the object of solicitation 
(mixed intermittently with pressure and intimidation) by the central 
parties to the armed conflicts. Yet China steadfastly refuses to 
dissociate itself from the Pol Pot forces in Kampuchea; there is also very 
little evidence to indicate China's willingness to tolerate the existence 
of a powerful Vietnam acting independently of Peking. It is little wonder 
that so many in Southeast Asia doubt the sincerity and durability of 
China's long-term intentions toward the area. 
It is possible, however, that some elements in the Chinese leadership 
have doubts about the wisdom of their long-term policy towards Vietnam. 
Irrespective of geographic proximity, Hanoi seems no more likely to prove 
pliant and accommodating to China than it was to France or the United 
States in earlier conflicts. At the same time, the militarization of the 
Sino-Vietnamese border and the enhanced Soviet military presence in and 
around Indochina have created new and potentially serious security problems 
for the PRC. The tacit limits sought by Peking in order to avoid conflict 
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escalation along the Sino-Soviet border find few if any parallels in 
China's actions to the south. Some leaders in Peking may have cause to 
wonder how much security has been achieved by the opening of a major new 
combat front to the south where the economic, political as well as military 
requirements could well prove substantial and long-term. 
Yet Vietnam is not the only powerful, independent-minded regional 
Communist power with which China must deal. Notwithstanding China's long 
and close ties to North Korea, there are immediate comparisons one can draw 
with Vietnam. However great Kim Il-song's suspicions of the Soviet Union, 
he is no more likely than Le Duan to prove pliant and yielding to Chinese 
policy preferences when they differ from his own. North Korea's vocal and 
unambiguous denunciations of American policy in Northeast Asia--a region 
where China has a strong interest in maintaining a considerable U.S. 
presence--provide ample testimony to this fact. 
The risks and dilemmas for Peking in this case are very great. At one 
level, the Chinese cannot afford to offend Pyongyang's sensibilities; thus 
they continue to provide declaratory support for North Korea's long-term 
policy objectives. At the same time, however, Deng Xiaoping has sought to 
reassure the United States of the clear Chinese interest in maintaining 
stability on the Korean peninsula. This delicate balancing act requires a 
degree of Chinese disassociation from some of the North's more provocative 
views of U.S. and Japanese policy, yet without running major risks to 
China's long-term relationship with and commitment to Pyongyang. Yet Kim, 
like Vietnam's leaders, has both the opportunity and capability to act 
independent of the PRC. This does not mean that China in some inevitable 
way will face a moment of decision vis-a-vis the North comparable to its 
outright break with Vietnam in 1978, but the general circumstances cannot 
preclude this possibility. China may then yet again have to ask whether 
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and how it is prepared to live with a powerful if smaller state on its 
borders (whether Communist or non-Communist) that acts on its own behalf, 
no matter what the consequences for its relations with China. 
It is clear, therefore, that the 1980s could well force the Chinese to 
confront the limits of their strategic vision in several respects. In both 
the Communist and non-Communist world, the multiplicity of national voices 
and the capability to pursue distinct national interests continue to grow. 
The time may not be too far distant when the Chinese will have to concede 
that issues of international security derive from far more than the 
machinations of one or another "hegemonic" power. At the same time, it 
will prove increasingly difficult for China to continue to describe itself 
as a defensive inferior power which seeks simply to deflect challenges to 
PRC sovereignty and security. Indeed, broader political-economic trends in 
Asia may well point in contrary directions. To consider this issue 
further, we need to turn briefly to the possible consequences of China's 
emergence in Asian politics in the coming decade. 
Some Concluding Observations 
The dramatic and even remarkable departures in Chinese policymaking in 
recent years have provoked considerable speculation on both the limits and 
consequences of political change, both within China and in terms of China's 
international role. There seems little doubt that leaders in the People's 
Republic have a growing stake in the international system, with China 
assuming a larger and vital presence in both Asian and global affairs. As 
we have tried to demonstrate, much of this change was generated by an 
increasing recognition of China's vulnerability and international 
isolation. Yet, to the extent that China was no longer able to stand apart 
from the international system as a whole, the need for China to reconsider 
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the viability of its past approaches to diplomacy, security, and economic 
development has also increased. 
How far might this process lead? How seriously, for example, have the 
Chinese thought not only about the growth of Soviet power, but about the 
political and economic transformations underway within Asia independent of 
either of the superpowers? How long and how much can a highly centralized 
planned economy such as China's continue to facilitate the pledges of 
Peking's leaders to achieve breakthroughs in economic development? To what 
extent do the Chinese see the need to accommodate to the economic, 
technological, institutional, and commercial practices, not only of the 
West, but of the newly industrializing societies of Asia? What risk does 
such accommodation pose to China's professed commitment to Marxist-Leninist 
values? And to what extent will coercion (or the threat of coercion) serve 
as a pivotal factor in China's security strategy, or are other approaches 
feasible and less costly? 
There are no obvious answers to these questions, nor does it appear 
that all levels of the Chinese leadership hierarchy have demonstrated equal 
creativity in "emancipating the mind." Yet the long-term prospects^ for 
stability and peace in Asia could well depend on how fully and 
unequivocally China is prepared to interact with the outside world, 
irrespective of how others approach issues of international security and 
development. Thus, as China seeks to move more fully into the ranks of the 
industrializing countries, its power and influence will be felt first and 
foremost in Asia. No one can dispute that China will have a central role 
to play in determining Asia's political, economic, and security courses in 
the coming decade. It remains for the Chinese not only to recognize this 
role, but to weigh the potential effects of the growth of Chinese economic, 
poltical, and military power. Leaders in Peking will hopefully appreciate 
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their potential contribution if Asia in the coming decade is to break out 
of its long, unhappy history of major power competition and armed conflict. 
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Security Policy of South Korea* 
Young C. Kim 
The objective of this paper is to delineate South Korean perceptions 
of matters that have a bearing on their country's national security policy. 
A virtual obsession with the threat of North Korea pervades the thinking of 
South Koreans. For them, it is an article of faith that North Korea has 
both the intent and military capability to unify Korea by force. This 
belief is related to their interpretation of the North Korean theory and 
strategy of unification. North Korea views unification as the liberation 
of South Korean compatriots from the "yoke of American colonialism and 
imperialism" and its "puppets" in the South. The revolution to which North 
Korea is committed is not complete without a corresponding revolution in 
the South. North Korea has maintained that there is no more urgent and 
supreme national task than unification of the country. The South Koreans 
see North Korea's commitment to the goal of unification as a powerful 
driving force shaping its actions. 
On numerous occasions North Korea has affirmed its desire for_ and 
commitment to a peaceful approach to reunification. According to the North 
Korean view, peaceful unification is possible only when a successful 
revolution in South Korea results in the expulsion of "American 
imperialism" and the overthrow of its "puppets," thereby establishing a 
"people's democratic government." This conception, the South Koreans 
argue, is proof that North Korea has not, and indeed, cannot abandon the 
goal of the forcible overthrow of the South Korean government. 
*This paper is primarily based on the conversations the author has 
had with South Korean analysts in recent years. 
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The North Koreans also say that another peaceful method would be 
operative if a patriotic and nationalistic government were established in 
South Korea. Presumably, such a government would successfully confer with 
North Korea regarding the issue of a unified political authority. The 
South Koreans argue that the North Korean definition of "patriotic, 
nationalistic, and democratic" leaders who would lead such a government 
means only those who would accept North Korea's terms for unification. 
An alternative peaceful method that the North Koreans propose is the 
establishment of a confederation. To the South Koreans the idea of a 
confederation is a sinister scheme for subversion and eventual control of 
the South. 
According to the official view held in Pyongyang, the possibility of 
war arises only if war is forced upon the North by the South. In that 
event, the "imperialistic" forces would be defeated and the "war for the 
liberation of the South" would be won. The South Koreans contend that, 
since North Korea still claims that the South started the 1950 war, North 
Korea could initiate a war at any time and claim that it was responding to 
the invading forces of the South. The South Koreans insist that North 
Korea intends to employ military means for realizing its goal of 
unification. 
Aside from these interpretations of the North Korean "theory" of 
unification, the South Koreans find clear evidence of Pyongyang's 
aggressive intent in the record of North Korea's behavior, especially in 
the following: 
1) North Korea has advocated the overthrow of the government in the 
South in unequivocal terms; 
2) North Korea has insisted that the American military presence in 
South Korea be terminated; 
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3) North Korea has persistently rejected South Korean proposals 
designed to reduce the tensions between the two Koreas. The proposals 
include calls for economic and cultural exchange, the negotiation of a non-
aggression pact, and a summit meeting between the presidents of North and 
South Korea. For South Korea, the North's categorical refusal to negotiate 
a bilateral non-use-of-force agreement is a most eloquent testimony of 
North Korea's aggressive intent. 
4) North Korea has persisted in its claim that the government of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the sole legal government for all 
of Korea. North Korea has never acknowledged the legitimacy of the 
government in the South. 
Evidence of North Korean aggressive intent is not limited to the 
spoken and written word, however. South Korea cites specific instances of 
aggressive behavior as well, namely: 
1) a series of armed infiltrations into South Korea, the most dramatic 
of which was an attempted raid on the Blue House (the presidential office 
and residence); 
2) the North Korean capture of a U.S. vessel, the Pueblo; 
3) the construction of underground tunnels in the Demilizatized Zone 
(DMZ) area; and 
4) North Korea's all-out invasion of the South in 1950. 
South Korean analysts believe the North Korean military capability to 
be far superior to their own. They express particular concern about North 
Korean firepower and mobility. In terras of tanks, artillery, and tactical 
aircraft, North Korea has a two- or three-to-one advantage. This ratio is 
four to one in naval vessels. North Korea is also considered superior in 
defense production and logistical preparedness; and this preparedness 
further reinforces South Korea's perception of North Korea's aggressive 
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intentions. Specifically, certain developments and activities in North 
Korea are cited: 
1) the forward deployment of substantial combat forces; 
2) a sharp increase in tanks and artillery units in the forward areas; 
3)the construction of naval bases near the DMZ and a few airfields in 
the forward areas; 
4) the construction of hardened facilities, especially in the forward 
areas; 
5) the fortification of the northern half of the DMZ; 
6) the construction of tunnels underneath the DMZ; and 
7) the augmentation of the Special Forces. 
The scope of the threat is further augmented when North Korea's allies 
are considered. In the view of the South Koreans, the probability of a 
North Korean attack on the South is shaped in part by the character of 
North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of 
China (PRC). The South Koreans are fully conscious that Pyongyang's two 
imporant allies have contiguous land borders with North Korea and that the 
mutual defense treaty North Korea has with each of these allies provides 
for prompt military assistance. 
Both the Soviet Union and the PRC have expressed their strong 
support—at least publicly--for the North Korean policy of unification. 
Neither has responded to South Korea's overtures for official government-
level contacts. The Soviet Union has permitted limited private contacts, 
while the PRC has shunned practically all forms of contact with the 
Republic of Korea. Both supply military and economic assistance to the 
Pyongyang government. The Soviet Union provides North Korea with highly 
sophisticated weapon systems. If war occurs, the South Koreans feel 
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certain that both the Soviet Union and the PRC would, perhaps reluctantly, 
be drawn into it against South Korea and the United States. 
The increasing level of cooperation between the United States and the 
PRC, and between Japan and the PRC has somewhat attenuated the intensity of 
South Korea's concern about the PRC. In view of China's preoccupation with 
modernization as well as its concern for the Soviet Union, the PRC is 
thought to desire stability in the Korean peninsula. The outbreak of war 
would be likely to increase North Korea's dependence on the Soviet Union. 
China, the South Koreans reason, would not want greater Soviet influence 
over North Korea. The Soviet policy toward Korea is thought to be 
constrained by a desire to avoid military confrontation with the United 
States. Until recently, South Koreans saw a degree of Soviet restraint 
operating on North Korea. Lately, however, the South Koreans have become 
fearful that, as Moscow perceives an increase in anti-Soviet cooperation 
among the United States, the PRC, and Japan, Soviet restraint may not last 
. long. 
According to South Korean analysts, war on the Korean peninsula is 
most likely to be intiated by surprise attacks from the North Korean 
Special Forces on such targets in the rear of South Korea as military, 
industrial, and communication installations. The Special Forces units 
would reach South Korean targets by air, sea, and ground. This, they 
reason, would be followed by a blitzkrieg invasion across the DMZ designed 
to conquer the entire country within a week or two. Such a strategy would 
be designed to subjugate South Korea militarily before any effective 
assistance could arrive from the continental United States. Thus, the U.S. 
government would be confronted with a fait accompli regarding the fall of 
all of South Korea. 
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Another scenario envisages a North Korean invasion of Seoul. 
Depending on U.S. counter-measures North Korea, upon capturing that city, 
might call for a ceasefire and negotiations. The conquest of Seoul, 
however, would lead to an effective strangulation of South Korea. 
Still another scenario envisages limited North Korean attacks on the 
five islands on the West coast. The successful seizure of the islands 
might or might not be followed by attacks elsewere. North Korea would gain 
not only an important strategic, naval advantage but also important 
political and psychological victories. The lack of a firm military 
response by the United States would severely test relations between the 
U.S. and the Republic of Korea. Disregarding U.S. restraint, South Korea 
might retaliate unilaterally. Such an incident would probably heighten the 
level of American concern about the danger of U.S. involvement in a ground 
war in Korea, giving rise to domestic pressures for U.S. disengagement. 
Any discussion of South Korean security policy would be incomplete 
without some survey of South Kroea's conception of effective deterrence and 
countermeasures. South Korean analysts are firm in their belief that the 
most important deterrent to North Korean attacks on the South has been the 
presence of U.S. military forces, especially ground forces. The strength 
of these troops units and their deployment below the DMZ have been such 
that North Koreans know that their attack would bring about a virtually 
automatic U.S. military involvement. Furthermore, the South Koreans 
acknowledge that a number of other factors have contributed to the overall 
effectiveness of deterrence. First, a substantial consensus exists in 
South Korea regarding the question of opposition to the North Korean regime 
and rule. North Korea would have to overcome deep anti-Communist--more 
accurately, anti-North Korean--sentiments to generate South Korean support 
for its policies. This has not been conducive to any unconventional 
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operations by the North. Second, the South Korean government is conscious 
that the economic development achieved under the late President Park has 
contributed to the political stability in the South. And third, the South 
Korean government is aware that stability on the Korean peninsula can be 
sustained only by a favorable distribution of regional power, in particular 
the military capabilities of the United States vis-a-vis North Korea and 
its allies. Thus, the South Korean government is sensitive to any 
developments that might alter the balance of power in the region. 
In recent years the growing Soviet military capability has been 
worrying the South Korean government. The shift of the military balance in 
favor of the Soviet Union would make the Soviet Union and the PRC less 
sensitive to U.S. objectives in South Korea. Similarly,North Korea might 
be more willing to take risks in the belief that the Soviet Union could 
effectively neutralize any U.S. countermeasures. 
South Korean analysts have watched with increasing dismay and concern 
what they view as signs of a paralysis of U.S. foreign and military 
policies, particularly under the Carter Administration. Recent 
developments that have deepened their anxiety include: the fall of South 
Vietnam, President Carter's initial policy of troop withdrawal, his 
decision not to produce the B-l aircraft, his initial decision to defer 
production of neutron bombs, his weak response to Soviet combat troops in 
Cuba, the fall of the Shah and Carter's handling of the hostage crisis, and 
Carter's ineffectual response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. South 
Koreans are greatly concerned about the impact these developments might 
have on North Korea's (and her allies') perceptions of U.S. resolve and 
capabilities to defend South Korea. 
To the South Koreans, the fall of their capital, Seoul, would be their 
demise. Whether militarily feasible or not, the South Korean government's 
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strategy advocates the destruction of any invading forces north of Seoul. 
Conscious of the military superiority of the North, the South Korean 
government has been striving to strengthen its own military capabilities by 
successive force modernization programs. The government considers it 
imperative that, in order to attain a desired degree of military self-
sufficiency, the momentum of economic development be sustained. This, in 
turn, assumes a degree of political stability. 
In relations with the Third World, with Japan, and with the U.S. 
South Korea has vigorously pursued what it calls "security-diplomacy." It 
has sought--without much success--political, economic, and cultural 
contacts with the Soviet Union and the PRC. The objectives are to lessen 
whatever enmity the Soviet Union and the PRC might feel toward South Korea 
and to provide these countries with some incentives to restrain North 
Korea. Even if the two countries lack leverage or make no attempt to 
restrain North Korea, a mere possibility of ties between South Korea and 
North Korea's allies might restrain North Korea. At the same time, South 
Korean analysts are concerned that any movement in South Korea's relations 
with the Soviet Union and/or the PRC might accelerate an American demarche 
toward North Korea without exacting corresponding flexibility on the part 
of the Soviet Union and the PRC. 
South Korea has also sought to improve its relations with the Third 
World countries to ensure its access to natural resources and to win 
diplomatic support from non-aligned countries. In view of the North Korean 
diplomatic efforts directed toward these countries, such a policy is deemed 
essential. The South Koreans are convinced that as the magnitude of 
Japan's economic stake in South Korea increases, Japan's interest in the 
security of South Korea will become greater. They are, of course, aware of 
the constitutional and political constraints operating on Japan's military 
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role and do not expect any overt military assistance. Instead, they seek 
Japanese economic and technical assistance, which would accelerate South 
Korea's economic development and defense industry. 
The South Koreans are also conscious of the indirect impact Japanese-
South Korean ties would have on U.S. policy toward South Korea. They 
believe that as Japanese interests in South Korea become greater, the 
United States itself will attach greater importance to South Korea. This 
is not because Japan would attempt to exert greater influence on the United 
States on South Korea's behalf, but because the United States, as it became 
aware of Japanese sensitivity to South Korea's security, would also become 
more sensitive to South Korea's security interests. South Korean analysts 
are aware that the Japanese government's position on the troop withdrawal 
question was generally beneficial to South Korea. They feel that South 
Korean security is of vital importance to Japan's own security and expect 
Japan to provide more diplomatic and economic support. South Korea also 
expects Japan to try to persuade the Soviet Union and China to exert a 
moderating influence on North Korea. 
South Korea does not object to normal trade and cultural relations 
between Japan and North Korea, but has expressed strong displeasure 
whenever political contacts have occurred. South Korea objects strenuously 
to Japan's export of items that would have military application. 
To the South Koreans, the United States has always been the single 
most important ally and protector of their independence. They have not yet 
reconciled themselves to the idea that U.S. troops could someday be 
withdrawn. Using all means available, the South Korean government has 
attempted to prolong the U.S. military presence and to maximize American 
military assistance. Indeed, the history of South Korea's security policy 
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may be summarized as the history of a singular pursuit in strengthening 
political, economic, and military ties with the United States. 
In 1953, the South Korean government insisted upon--and obtained--U.S. 
consent to the Mutual Defense Treaty. In 1965, South Korea dispatched 
combat troops to South Vietnam in compliance with American requests. 
Complex motivations underlay that decision. The sense of obligation to the 
United States for rallying to South Korea's defense in 1950-53 played a 
significant role. Of greater importance, the decision was made in the 
belief that the move would forestall a further withdrawal of U.S. forces 
from Korea. 
Several incidents of the late 1960s contributed to the South Koreans' 
growing anxiety, both in general and concerning the U.S. The cautious 
attitude shown by the United States regarding the North Korean raid on the 
Blue House was one cause of major dissatisfaction. The U.S. response to 
the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo, especially secret negotiations 
conducted between the United States and North Korea, intensified South 
Korea's concern. Doubts grew about U.S. determination to deal decisively 
with North Korea's aggression. South Korea reacted to the situation by 
strengthening its military reserve system and announcing the establishment 
of a defense industry. The United States attempted to placate South Korea 
by agreeing to aid the development of South Korea's munitions industry and 
by increasing the level of U.S. military assistance to South Korea. 
The announcement of the Nixon Doctrine came in July 1969, and during 
the following May, South Korea was informed of U.S. plans to withdraw the 
U.S. Second Division from Korea. During the ensuing period of 
negotiations, South Korea again sought unsuccessfully U.S. consent to 
transform the existing security treaty into a NATO-type of treaty. The 
U.S. government pledged to support a force modernization program. South 
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Korea was to be further shocked, however, by the announcement in July 1971 
of President Nixon's forthcoming visit to Peking. In response, the South 
Koreans pursued with even greater intensity the development of its defense 
industry and a military modernization program. The fall of South Vietnam 
and the militant speech given by North Korean President Kim II-song in 
Peking greatly heightened a sense of crisis and insecurity among the South 
Koreans. As a result, the implementation of the military modernization 
program was given even higher priority. 
President Carter's decision in 1977 to withdraw U.S. ground forces 
within four to five years deepened South Korean concern about the 
dependability of U.S. defense commitments. The South Koreans found the 
U.S. government's rationale for the decision totally unconvincing. To 
them, the move signaled the erosion of America's political will to defend 
South Korea and the end of a certain and automatic involvement of U.S. 
forces in the event of war. 
South Korea subsequently sought U.S. assistance in expanding its 
defense industry and in strengthening its military capabilities to 
compensate for the decreasing U.S. presence. South Korea grudgingly 
accepted the compensatory measures offered by the United States, but 
insisted that these measures be taken prior to or at least simultaneously 
with the U.S. troop withdrawal. The July 1979 announcement by the Carter 
Administration that further U.S. troop reduction would be held in abeyance 
until 1981 somewhat allayed the intensity of South Korea's concern and the 
sense of imminent crisis. 
South Korean leaders greeted President Reagan's electoral victory with 
much enthusiasm. For them, the electoral outcome signified not only an end 
to American preoccupation with human rights, but also an end to the 
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vacillation and weakness in the conduct of U.S. foreign and military 
policies. 
The result of the February 1981 summit meeting between President 
Reagan and President Chun Du-hwan far exceeded the expectations of the 
South Korean leadership. South Koreans were immensely gratified with the 
substantive contents of the talks as well as the symbolism that accompanied 
the meeting. They were duly impressed with the strong reaffirmation of the 
U.S. commitment to South Korea's defense and with the willingness of the 
Reagan Administration to be forthcoming on weapons transfer and on the 
build-up of the South Korean defense industry. 
South Korea has been extremely sensitive to any indications of the 
development of U.S.-North Korean relations. South Korea's position has 
been one of reciprocity, i.e., as long as North Korea's allies (the Soviet 
Union and the PRC) enter into the same level of relationship with South 
Korea, Seoul has no objection to comparable contacts between the U.S. and 
North Korea. In 1979, South Korea, together with the United States, called 
for a tripartite conference among the United States and North and South 
Korea. However, it remains opposed to the bilateral talks between the 
United States and North Korea in the absence of corresponding movement in 
the relations of South Korea with North Korean allies. 
South Koreans generally viewed Congressman Stephen J. Solarz' trip to 
Pyongyang in 1980 with disfavor. South Koreans reason that North Korea's 
insistence on bilateral talks with the United States has the sole objective 
of terminating the U.S. military presence from Korea. This is precisely a 
major reason why South Korea is so sensitive to U.S.-North Korean contacts. 
It should be noted, finally, that the perceptions discussed in the 
preceding pages are those of the South Korean government--or more 
accurately, the South Korean perceptions as I see them. Whether all of 
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them are consistent with reality or to what extent I share them are 
separate questions. 
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